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ABSTRACT 
Jason Whan Park, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010 
 
 
Although Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are potential value-creation opportunities, 
why they tend to occur in waves is a mystery to scholars and managers alike. Most models of 
M&A waves are unilevel, reductionist, and Gaussian, whereas wave patterns are arguably multi-
level, emergent, and non-normally distributed.  Using complexity theory, I interpret waves as 
emergent expressions of a self-organized critical ecology of firms conceptualized as a complex 
adaptive system.  My observation that aggregate U.S. M&A waves from 1895 to 2008 are power-
law-distributed lends support.  The view that waves are self-organized critical phenomena, 
similar to earthquakes and avalanches, facilitates integration of prior wave theories.  I then 
employ process-tracing to generate a historical narrative of the Great Merger Wave of 1898-
1903, from which I obtain a robust process for waves consistent with a CAS interpretation of 
these phenomena: (1) a privatizing, market-expanding and financially innovating transportation 
network generates (2a) laissez-faire regulation, (2b) economic competition, and (2c) financial 
arbitrage, leading to (3) a burst of consolidation.  My process explanation explains the power 
law’s emergence, and may help to understand better the process dynamics of M&A waves. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation focuses on a venerable management phenomenon: merger and 
acquisition (M&A) waves.  M&A activity occurs constantly yet unevenly in cyclical non-
periodic bursts, or waves (Barkoulas, Baum, & Chakraborty, 2001; Town, 1992).  Their origin is 
a mystery, despite their having inspired a vast, hundred-year-old literature.  M&A waves are also 
relevant to practice, since M&A at a wave’s beginning can create value (McNamara, Haleblain, 
& Dykes, 2008; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2005).  Thus, it is important for managers to 
“see them coming.”  Given the theoretical and practical import of understanding these 
phenomena better, an integrated description and explanation of M&A waves is needed. 
The two essays of this dissertation are undergirded by a set of interlocking ontological, 
epistemological and methodological commitments.  Ontologically speaking, I adopt an 
objectivist stance: the social world exists “out there,” independent of human perception.  In other 
words, M&A waves are real things that have an existence apart from various scholars’ sensory 
observations of them.  Epistemologically speaking, however, I adopt a subjectivist stance: that 
objective reality may be perceived differently, depending on one’s unique cognitive framework.  
In other words, researchers may have different interpretations of M&A waves, depending on the 
theoretical paradigms they subscribe to.  Therefore, methodologically speaking, I am a pluralist.  
In other words, to generate knowledge of social phenomena, neither quantitative nor qualitative 
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methodologies are unconditionally better than the other, but both complement each other in 
verifying the truth-claims scholars make about M&A waves.  This set of philosophical 
commitments encapsulates the “critical realist” perspective (Johnson & Duberley, 2000). 
Thus, both essays use the same integrative theory to make sense of the same objective 
reality.  However, Essay One employs a traditional deductive, quantitative approach to describe 
M&A waves in terms of an empirical regularity observed in their overall distribution’s statistical 
properties.  Subsequently, Essay Two utilizes a less conventional inductive, qualitative method 
to explain the first essay’s empirical regularity in terms of a narrative outlining a set of social 
processes inferred from a single M&A wave’s historical context.   
1.1 OVERVIEW OF ESSAYS 
Current M&A wave research can be summarized as follows: M&A waves happen during 
stock market booms (Nelson, 1959), are prompted by technology shocks (Gort, 1969; Mitchell & 
Mulherin, 1996), involve the arbitraging of firm securities (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, & 
Viswanathan, 2005; Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003), are 
motivated by managerial search processes (Iyer & Miller, 2008), and involve a social contagion 
process (Haunschild, 1993; Stearns & Allan, 1996).  These findings originate from 
macroeconomics, neoclassical economics, behavioral economics, the Carnegie behavioral 
school, and sociology, respectively.  Yet these paradigms begin with competing theoretical 
assumptions regarding the level and unit of analysis, (in)efficient markets, (boundedly) rational 
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managers, and primacy of M&A wave driver.  Furthermore, each explanation works well for a 
few waves or just one wave, but often applies poorly to the others.  Thus, a more integrated 
account of M&A waves can extend prior theories and perhaps explain some of the theoretical 
anomalies.   
Complexity theory, or the study of complex adaptive systems (CAS), can provide such 
integration.  In a CAS model, M&A waves are macro-level patterns generated from an ecology 
of firms competing for resources at the micro-level.  Resource-competition gradually builds up 
pressure in the ecology until it is barely stable with respect to further perturbations, i.e. self-
organized critical (SOC) (Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1987).  Then a SOC M&A wave dissipates 
the pent-up tension in a nonlinear return of the system to dynamic equilibrium. Further ongoing 
resource-competition again leads to recurrent, alternating states of tension and dissipation, and 
hence more SOC waves.  By analogizing from other SOC phenomena such as avalanches and 
earthquakes, I try to integrate prior theories by (1) addressing macroeconomists’ concern with 
stock and M&A markets’ boom-bust patterns; (2) considering neoclassical economists’ 
exogenous shocks as important; (3) embracing behavioral finance scholars’ inefficient markets; 
(4) complementing Carnegie behavioralists’ views of firms as goal-directed systems that use 
decision heuristics to adapt to performance feedback (Iyer & Miller, 2008); and (5) utilizing 
sociological diffusion processes. 
Now the spatial and temporal “fingerprint” of CAS at the SOC state is the power law 
distribution of Paretian statistics (Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1988).  Thus, one tests whether a 
phenomenon hews to the CAS model by observing this empirical signature for the system, 
analogous to how a hunter infers the existence of a game animal by tracking its characteristic 
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prints in snow or mud.  Essentially a straight line of negative slope on log-log paper, the power 
law means that a quantity N is expressed as a power of another quantity s: N(s) ~ s-a.  Some real-
world power laws are shown in Figure 1.  In the first essay, I observe a power law size-
distribution of aggregate U.S. M&A waves from 1895 to 2008 (as shown in Figure 1), thus 
supporting a CAS model of them.  In other words, most M&A waves are small, some are 
medium, and a few are very large, confirming a non-normal distribution for an essentially non-
linear phenomenon. 
The mysterious emergence of the power law distribution begs an explanation.  Yet the 
small sample size of six M&A waves precludes regression analysis, and the indeterminacy of 
CAS makes feasible only a narrative account of events post mortem (Bak, 1996).  Thus, the 
method of detailed predictions followed by reproducible experiments is untenable. 
But in its stead, qualitative methods emphasizing small-n samples, narrative analysis and 
historical events are ideally suited for this situation.  In the second essay, I use process-tracing, a 
within-case analytical technique, that combines certain elements of the case study and history.  
Like a case study, process-tracing tracks the development of a phenomenon of interest over time.  
And like a history, process tracing examines past events.  Unlike a case study, however, process-
tracing does not make use of contemporary sources, such as interviews.  And unlike a history, 
process tracing does not simply tell what happened, but argues about what happened (Goldstone, 
1991).   
Process tracing identifies robust processes (Goldstone, 1991), which show that across 
different historical contexts, (1) similar initial conditions confront (2) actors, who react in similar 
ways, to produce (3) similar outcomes.  Goldstone describes how Darwin’s theory of evolution 
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through natural selection is a process: (1) reproductive competition among species with variation 
among individuals leads (2) reproductively successful individuals to diffuse their traits 
throughout the population, giving rise to (3) new species. 
Through the process-tracing of books, government publications, and journal articles, I 
generate an initial atheoretical historical narrative.  19th century America grew from an agrarian 
society to a leading 20th-century industrial power.  During the Civil War, the Federal government 
consolidated power by helping build railroads initially for military transport (Roy, 1997).  
Investment bankers financed railroad mergers while politicians regulated the privatized railroad 
industry as it took civilian passengers and commercial cargo.  In the 1880s, modern managerial 
systems developed for railroads were applied to corporations, as functional departments were 
organized under single industrialists.  Firms reached unprecedented size and scope to achieve 
cost efficiencies and scale economies, until a national market connected urban populations via a 
transcontinental railroad network (Chandler, 1959).  In the 1890s, the Sherman Antitrust Act was 
only weakly enforced as exhibited in the E.C. Knight decision of 1895, while the McKinley 
Tariff protected domestic manufacturing for Eastern commerce, and the Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act aided Western farmers and miners honoring debts with inflated silver dollars.  The 
Panic of 1893 derailed decades of progress, and the ensuing depression led to Robert McKinley’s 
election as President on a pro-business platform.  The Gold Standard Act of 1900 de jure ended 
bimetallism, while tariffs created attractive industries inviting domestic entry and generating 
price competition.  Consolidation ensued (Commission, 1900; Commission & House, 1901) as 
industrialists utilized investment bankers to underwrite securities and promote M&A deals.  As 
industrial stocks became popular (Navin & Sears, 1955), bankers profitably arbitraged securities 
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issues of the new consolidations.  A robust market for corporate control emerged as M&A 
activity necessitated financing and profits from the latter enabled growth of the former.  
McKinley’s assassination one year after re-election in 1900 allowed President Roosevelt to 
address “the trust problem,” while monopolistic industry structures reduced competition, 
stabilized prices and halted further consolidation.  Corporations inevitably were unable to pay 
dividends on overcapitalized stock, resulting in failure and reorganization.   
With this narrative, I outline a robust process for the Great Merger Wave.  As shown in 
Figure 2, (1) the development of a revolutionary transportation network which privatized, 
expanded markets, and financially matured, leads (2a) politicians to adopt laissez-faire 
regulation; (2b) industrialists to engage in economic competition, and (2c) financiers to 
participate in innovative arbitrage; all interacting in a (3) burst of consolidation.  I also explain 
how the wave ends: (1) as the wave generates public outcry, monopolistic industry structures and 
firm overcapitalization, (2a) politicians enforce antitrust laws; (2b) industrialists engage in 
anticompetitive, inefficient strategies; (2c) financiers lose confidence in securities markets; all of 
which interacted to (3) quickly decelerate M&A activity. 
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Critical realism undergirds my dissertation.  The first essay deductively proposes a 
theoretical descriptive model that is supported by quantitative data.  The second essay then 
inductively analyzes qualitative data to create a theoretical process explanation of M&A waves.  
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Thus, my dissertation provides an integrated description and explanation of M&A waves which 
could lead to future prediction of these phenomena.  A potential third study would necessitate an 
extension of prior philosophical commitment to one of pragmatic critical realism, which would 
argue that the truth-claims of my CAS model and robust process are confirmed only when they 
solve “real-world” problems.  Thus, a third essay might attempt to validate the second essay’s 
process model with existing quantitative data.  A valid model predicting M&A waves would 
allow for their anticipation and possible shaping in order to realize their value-creation potential.  
With this set of manuscripts covering description, explanation and, in the future, prediction of 
M&A waves, I hope to advance understanding of these mysterious and relevant phenomena. 
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2.0  ESSAY ONE: BIG SURF: SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY IN MERGER 
AND ACQUISITION WAVES 
Even after a century of debate, Merger and Acquisition (M&A) waves remain a mystery 
to economists, sociologists, finance scholars and strategists alike.  Brealey and Myers  regard 
M&A waves as one of the ten most important unsolved questions in financial economics.  
Various explanations for their occurrence have been suggested, such as capital markets drivers 
(Nelson, 1959), technological innovations (Gort, 1969; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996), firm 
securities misvaluations (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003), corporate board interlocks (Haunschild, 
1993) and managerial responses to performance feedback (Iyer & Miller, 2008).  While each of 
these accounts has merit, they emerge from competing theoretical paradigms, and provide only 
partial explanation, as they do not explain why waves keep coming back.  In this paper, I offer an 
alternative interpretation in which M&A waves are part of the evolutionary dynamic of an 
ecology of firms, and I provide preliminary empirical support.   
Existing M&A wave models tend to be unilevel, reductionist and Gaussian; yet they 
attempt to describe  a phenomenon that is arguably multilevel, emergent (Lovejoy, 1927) and 
non-normally distributed.   Thus, we suggest that a complex adaptive systems (CAS) model is a 
likely candidate for better explanation of M&A waves.  In a CAS model, M&A waves are 
emergent macro-level patterns resulting from the collective behavior of many firms competing 
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with each other for resources at the micro-level.  M&A waves are evidence that the system of 
firms builds a self-organized critical system (SOC) (Bak, 1996), i.e., M&A waves occur when 
the ecology of firms develops some instability as part of its evolutionary dynamic, and are a 
mechanism of return to a form of dynamic equilibrium, a state that characterizes the system’s life 
between waves.  Over time, long periods of near-dormant equilibrium (low M&A activity) 
alternate with short, spasmodic bursts of dissipative change (the M&A waves), a longitudinal 
dynamic known as punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge & Gould, 1972). Self-organized Criticality 
is ubiquitous in nature, from earthquakes to mass extinctions and meanders in rivers. 
The empirical signature of SOC phenomena is the power law distribution (Bak et al., 
1987, 1988) which follows a negatively sloping straight line on log-log paper.  I looked to see if 
M&A waves’ size distribution expressed a high frequency of small waves in one tail and a low 
frequency of large-size observations in the other tail.  I find that from 1895 to 2008, most 
aggregate U.S. M&A waves are small, some are medium, and a few are very large, which 
supports a CAS model of M&A waves, and suggests that they are indeed multilevel, emergent 
and non-Gaussian.  The CAS model is multi-level because it features a large number of adaptive 
organizations which interact using simple rules to generate complex aggregate M&A wave 
patterns.  The CAS model expresses emergence because the power law distribution 
“mysteriously” originates from SOC M&A waves and cannot be easily explained by modeling 
the interactions of the individual firms (Morel & Ramanujam, 1999).  Finally, CAS models are 
non-Gaussian because they rely on Paretian power laws instead of normal bell-curves.  
Because SOC M&A waves share the dynamical processes of SOC earthquakes and 
avalanches, I analogize from them in order to integrate prior M&A wave theories.  In this first 
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essay, I review prior literature, and then posit a CAS model.  The empirical analysis and results 
follow, and I conclude with a discussion of implications to research and practice. 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
I first cover the three economic theories of M&A waves, followed by behavioral and 
sociological accounts.  Subsequently, I introduce complexity theory. 
 
2.1.1 Economic Theories of M&A Waves 
The three economic M&A wave theories focus on different levels and units of analysis, 
and differ in their assumptions of market efficiency and manager rationality.  Macroeconomists 
subscribe to the “capital markets” thesis at the aggregate level.  Neoclassical economists argue 
the “industry shocks” thesis at the industry level.  Behavioral economists advocate the “firm 
misvaluation” thesis at the deal level.  All three theories assume manager rationality.  However, 
the first two assume efficient markets, while the third assumes inefficient markets. 
    
2.1.1.1 Capital markets 
This hypothesis suggests that macroeconomic variables drive M&A activity.  
Specifically, a market for corporate capital was necessary to absorb the large securities issues of 
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the consolidations of the turn of the 20th century M&A wave, as well as allow financiers and 
promoters to induce independent business owners to submit their family legacies to the large 
corporations of the era (Nelson, 1959; Roy, 1997).  The empirical support is the robust positive 
correlation of stock prices (as an indicator of capital market conditions) with aggregate M&A 
activity.  However, this thesis does not adequately explain stock or M&A boom-bust patterns. 
      
2.1.1.2 Industry shocks 
Neoclassical economists focus on external industry-level shocks, whether technological, 
regulatory or economic, triggering industry-wide reallocation of asset ownership via the least-
cost method: M&A.   Shocks create discrepancies in investors’ valuations of firms, which fosters 
economically rational M&A activity when the firm’s assets are valued more highly by non-
owners than owners (Gort, 1969).  Aggregate waves are combinations of multiple industry waves 
occurring simultaneously (Harford, 2005).     
The shock thesis is persuasive as well as compatible with the capital markets thesis, and it 
also explains industry wave clustering.   However, both hypotheses are based on two somewhat 
problematic assumptions: (1) efficient markets and (2) manager rationality.   The first is difficult 
to defend against evidence of market manias (e. g., the Internet M&A bubble of 1995-2000) and 
recent discoveries in behavioral finance (Shleifer, 2000).   Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz 
(2005) also observed that M&A returns in the 1990s wave were non-normally distributed, 
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violating the random walk hypothesis that securities price changes reflect random information.1  
Regarding the second assumption, behavioral economists (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) have 
observed cognitive biases in human economic decision-making.   Also, humans arguably rely on 
rules of thumb and experience—induction—just as much as rational utility-maximizing 
calculus—deduction (Mauboussin, 1997).   The shock thesis thus rests on assumptions which 
behaviorally oriented researchers may find problematic. 
   
2.1.1.3 Firm misvaluation 
Behavioral economists focus on the M&A deal and assume inefficient markets.  During 
buoyant stock markets, managers of highly overvalued acquirers rationally arbitrage their stock 
to purchase less overvalued targets (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003).  Acquirers know that their stock’s 
long-term value is lower than reflected in the current price, so by buying targets for stock, 
acquirers make these returns less negative.  In turn, targets achieve short-term gains from being 
acquired.  Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan (2004) further explain that each new M&A in an 
inefficient market increases the general expectation that the synergies of all firms are high, 
motivating managers to engage in more M&A.   Yet, with each additional deal the increase in 
expectations decreases, until the true value of the synergies is recognized and the M&A market 
crashes when individuals begin to question the value of the deals (Bruner, 2004).   
                                                 
1  Random walk theory implies a normal probability distribution of returns, which in turn implies efficient markets.    
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In sum, the misvaluation thesis explains the form of financing (stock during booms, cash 
during busts) used during M&A waves.  However, unlike the industry shock thesis, it does not 
address wave clustering by industry. 
 
2.1.2 Behavioral Explanations of M&A Waves 
For behavioral scholars (Iyer & Miller, 2008), rational-actor models of strategic action 
cannot account for the variations among firms over time in the intensity of search for M&A 
targets.   Assuming that all firms are identical, if all managers reacted rationally, they would act 
identically toward targets.    
Instead, managers are “boundedly” rational due to psychological limits on their cognitive 
information-processing capacities when operating in complex, uncertain environments.   They 
therefore “satisfice,” or attain realistic goals instead of economically maximize.  The resulting 
inefficiencies either generate organizational slack (i.e., extra unused human and financial capital) 
which motivates experimentation in the pursuit of new M&A, or induce performance below 
managerial expectations, leading to problemistic search for solutions in external targets.  
Although this unique framework helps us understand the drivers of M&A timing patterns, 
industry and aggregate waves are left unexplained.  Also, bounded rationality and satisficing are 
not compatible with economic assumptions of pure rationality and utility-maximizing.   
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2.1.3 Sociological Explanations of M&A Waves 
A research stream examining diffusion processes in social movements and organizational 
fields exists in the M&A literature.   These contagion models involve an originating source 
disseminating and communicating the M&A strategy to adopters exposed to the practice or its 
beneficial consequences, and who engage in mimicry or social learning (Strang & Soule, 1998).    
Haunschild (1993) observed that for the 1980s wave, board interlocks allowed knowledge 
about M&As to disseminate, diffusing the practice among firms.  Stearns and Allan (1996) noted 
similarly that then-fringe players and institutions like Michael Milken and Kohlberg, Kravis & 
Roberts adopted financial innovations like the leveraged buy-out or junk bond financing to 
execute M&A deals, the initial success of which facilitated widespread imitation throughout the 
business community.  Stearns et al. (1996) thus concluded that all waves are preceded by: (1) a 
permissive politico-legal climate; (2) “challenger” fringe actors in the organizational field; (3) 
challengers’ greater access to capital markets; (3) an innovation playing a key role in raising 
M&A activity; and (4) the introduction of the innovation by the challenger. 
Yet although we know board interlocks enable imitation, the drivers of imitation are less 
understood.  It is also unclear why fringe actors would abruptly emerge to challenge the business 
establishment, or why innovations would suddenly arise to facilitate M&A activity. 
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2.2 COMPLEXITY THEORY AND M&A WAVES 
  In sum, we know that waves can be preceded by technological shocks, and can occur in a 
positive economic and regulatory environment, amidst rapid credit expansion, and during stock 
market booms (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).   But these observations are assembled from 
competing theories, and provide partial explanation at best.   A more integrated account of wave 
patterns that extends prior theory and explains some of the anomalies would be helpful. 
I turn to complexity theory, or the study of complex adaptive systems (CAS), in search of 
such an integrated model.  The central intuition is best illustrated by the metaphor of a sand pile 
cellular automata (Bak et al., 1987).  Suppose I add grains of sand one-by-one onto a flat surface 
to generate a pile of sand.  Ceteris paribus, the rate at which grains are dropped will correlate to 
the size of the sand pile generated.  Over time, the pile becomes gradually but increasingly 
steeper until, at a critical point, an avalanche suddenly occurs, quickly collapsing the pile, which 
then rebuilds upon further addition of sand.  An external, localized perturbation such as a small 
gust of wind can cause a local avalanche.  The grains themselves obey the law of gravity on their 
unique trajectories when dislodged.  The degree of friction between grains determines the size 
and likelihood of an avalanche (Bak et al., 1988).  The pile consistently approaches the same 
critical steepness before each avalanche, while the avalanches themselves cannot be easily 
inferred from the individual movements of the sand grains, but rather are empirically verifiable 
phenomena that emerge (Lovejoy, 1927) at an aggregate level of analysis. 
Analogizing from the sand pile to M&A activity shows the theoretical value of a CAS 
model.  The capital market thesis notes that, ceteris paribus, the rate of M&A activity (the rate of 
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dropped grains) correlates to higher stock prices (the size of the sand pile representing the 
macroeconomy), yet the pattern over time is one of M&A booms (gradually increasing buildup 
of the pile) alternating with M&A busts (the dramatic drop-off of an avalanche in the pile, which 
then requires rebuild).  The shock thesis argues that perturbations to multiple industries (i.e., 
multiple wind gusts) can set off an aggregate M&A wave (a large avalanche).  The firm 
misvaluation thesis argues that each new misvalued M&A (each new dropped sand grain) 
increases the inefficiency in the M&A market  (the sand pile gets steeper and steeper) until their 
true value is revealed (the SOC state), at which point the M&A market crashes (an avalanche).  
Behavioral scholars suggest that organizations (the grains) are uniquely goal-directed systems 
(obey the law of gravity) that respond characteristically (fall down) to performance feedback 
(when dislodged).  Sociologists believe that the interlock among company boards (the friction 
between grains) determines the M&A strategy’s diffusion (an avalanche) throughout the business 
community (the sand pile).  The consistent return of challenger “fringe” actors in a business 
community (the consistent approach to the SOC state in the sand pile) occurs right before an 
M&A wave (an avalanche). While each model offers a plausible account of how sand grains 
behave, M&A waves (like avalanches) cannot be reduced to the movements of the individual 
firms in the economy (the individual grains in the pile), but are empirically verifiable phenomena 
that emerge at an aggregate level of analysis. 
In contrast, a CAS model can integrate prior theories by: (1) addressing the capital 
markets thesis’s concern for the boom-bust patterns in M&A activity; (2) attending to the shock 
thesis by considering exogenous shocks as important; (3) embracing the misvaluation thesis’s 
assumption of inefficient markets; (4) complementing the behavioral theory’s understanding of 
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firms as goal-directed systems that use decision heuristics to adapt to performance feedback (Iyer 
& Miller, 2008); and (5) utilizing sociological diffusion processes. 
 In the following sections, I describe the CAS model, the SOC mechanism, punctuated 
equilibrium, and the power law distribution. 
 
2.2.1 Complex Adaptive Systems 
A CAS is a system of interconnected and interacting components that, when subjected to 
a stressor or force, displays interesting aggregate patterns or behaviors essential to the system’s 
survival.  These global, collective behaviors or patterns are emergent (Lovejoy, 1927), or 
irreducible to the actions of the individual agents.  CAS are typically characterized by (1) 
aggregation, (2) adaptive schema, (3) nonlinearity, and (4) feedback loops (Holland, 1995). 
Consider a single ant, but one component of the ant colony.  Each of these component 
agents has a set of narrowly defined tasks, or just one task (Mauboussin, 1997).  However, 
engage a sufficiently large and interdependent aggregation of agents and what emerges is a 
functional ant colony.  Ant colonies serve to fend off insect enemies and provide strength in 
numbers.  The ants take in information from the environment and combine it with their own 
interaction with the environment to form adaptive schema or decision rules (Gell-Mann, 1995) 
which compete according to their utility, creating adaptive behavior.  CAS are also nonlinear: 
the aggregate behavior is more complicated than would be predicted by summing the parts 
(Mauboussin, 1997).  For example, a basic predator/prey model with “feast and famine” patterns 
  
20 
 
is generated from the product of variables, not the sum, such that cause and effect relationships 
are no longer simply linear (Mauboussin, 1997).  Positive feedback loops occur when the output 
of one iteration becomes the input of another iteration, thus amplifying the effect, similar to how 
an electric guitar amplifies the noise generated by the speaker it is plugged into, generating audio 
feedback.  Positive feedback generates explosive, self-reinforcing behaviors, while negative 
feedback dampens a system’s response to a stimulus. 
Now analogize to firms.  Individual firms have two basic tasks: (1) consume inputs (2) 
produce outputs.  But engage a sufficient aggregation of interconnected and interdependent 
firms, with one firm’s output being another firm’s input, and the outcome is a thriving economy 
replete with competitive, cooperative, and predatory firm behaviors (such as M&A).   Firms 
engage in these adaptive behaviors via the decision-rules obtained from the performance 
feedback managers receive from the surrounding economic environment.   One firm’s M&A 
changes the stances of its competitors, and subsequent defensive acquisitions may result in 
feedback loops among firms, triggering surges of M&A.   This predator-prey dynamic between 
acquirers and targets generates the non-linear “feast and famine” pattern of emergent M&A 
waves alternating with long stretches of little M&A activity.  
 
2.2.2 Self-organized Criticality 
CAS naturally evolve to the self-organized critical (SOC) state, when they transition 
from mere collections of individual agents into vibrant emergent phenomena (Bak, 1996) poised 
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far out of equilibrium (Bak & Sneppen, 1993).  Consistently adding sand grains onto a flat 
surface generates a pile of sand grains held together in a delicate interplay of forces (gravity and 
friction) which leads to avalanches every time a critically steep slope is reached, so that the pile 
“self-organizes” to this state.  Avalanches are the mechanisms for the SOC system to dissipate 
built-up tension and energy in a non-linear return to unstable equilibrium, much like earthquakes 
that violently dissipate the accumulated tension of continental plates when the earth’s crust 
cracks.  Analogously, as the business cycle progresses, firms become increasingly interdependent 
via M&A (like dropping sand grains that form a whole interconnected pile) occurring at a 
nominal, “linear” rate.  This process subjects the firms participating in the M&A market to 
increasing tension as a result of their interconnectivity.  Once the economy achieves the SOC 
state, even a single additional M&A (like one dropped grain) can unleash an outbreak of deals 
via the interdependence among firms in the M&A market.   These M&A waves are SOC 
phenomena expressing a non-linear return to dynamic equilibrium. 
 
2.2.3 Punctuated Equilibrium 
CAS are “alive,” and their activity over time is one of relative equilibrium interrupted by 
catastrophic instabilities, similar to mass extinctions in the fossil record.  Kauffman (1993) 
argued that life itself, in its nonlinear evolution over time and its admixture of inert order and 
random chaos, is complex.  Do M&A patterns express an evolutionary dynamic similar to that of 
biological evolution?   
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If so, perhaps their overall development and change embody punctuated equilibrium 
(Eldredge & Gould, 1972), a theory which positions itself in distinction from the Darwinist 
argument for gradual and smooth evolutionary change.  The basic settings of a biological 
ecosystem—(1) tension from a struggle for survival and (2) interconnectivity of interdependent 
species—produce long periods of incremental evolutionary change that are “punctuated” by 
mass extinctions which precede periods when the ecology undergoes a fast rebuild, hence the 
appearance of so many new species seemingly instantaneously.    
For example, consider an ecosystem comprising interconnected organisms, species and 
the surrounding habitat.  The interconnectivity of organisms produces an evolutionary dynamic, 
as embodied in ongoing natural selection from the struggle for survival.  This dynamic 
aggregates random changes over many successive generations of species as the less fit are 
naturally “discarded,” so the interaction of interdependent organisms is relatively stable most of 
the time.   But at some point in time, a significant advantageous variation cumulates to a species’ 
organisms, leading quickly to frustrated and intensified predation of predator and prey species, 
respectively.  These species, in turn, become ravaged, and their sad fate in turn harms other 
related predators but benefits other related prey.  Thus, one adaptation in a single organism or 
species can trigger mass extinctions throughout the entire ecosystem.2  
Analogously, consider organisms as firms, species as industries, and the economy as their 
habitat.  The adaptation processes of evolution in an aggregation of vitally interconnected firms 
proceed in natural selection as the aggregated effect of random M&A activity as less “fit,” i.e. 
                                                 
2  Bak & Sneppen (1993) modeled punctuated equilibrium of species in an ecosystem by simulating both their 
adaptive mutations and their interdependencies, an exercise that produced intermittent bursts of evolutionary activity 
alternating with long periods of calm. 
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economically viable, firms naturally become “extinct,” i.e., acquired.  For long periods, this 
competitive dynamic among firms is relatively stable.  But over time, some firms accrue slack 
resources in interacting with competitors, and these firms build on their adaptive success by 
engaging in M&As (Iyer & Miller, 2008) which represent the subsuming of a firm by a “fitter” 
one in an ecological niche (Bak & Sneppen, 1993).  Soon thereafter, intraindustry competitors 
become horizontal M&A targets as the adapted firms sow the seeds for future generations of 
firms in the industry (i.e., species).  Along the value chain, “prey” firms providing inputs to the 
adapted firms or “predator” firms consuming adapted firms’ outputs become preemptive targets 
of vertical integration.  The adapted firms also diversify vis-à-vis M&A as they interact in 
selection processes and establish symbiotic relationships with other species’ organisms, i.e., with 
related and unrelated industries’ firms.   Eventually, whole industries-species compete with other 
industry-species, resulting in mass firm extinctions: an aggregate M&A wave.  Thus, a single 
M&A deal can trigger off an aggregate M&A wave throughout the entire economy. 
 
2.2.4 The Power Law Signature 
In punctuated equilibrium, a CAS builds up evolutionary pressures over long periods of 
seeming stasis until the SOC state is reached, destabilizing the system and generating sudden 
bursts of systemic, revolutionary change.  This pattern violates Gaussian assumptions that 
extreme events happen but rarely, that the future can be predicted from the past, and that linear 
proportional cause-effect relationships hold.  In contrast, Paretian statistics seem to fit a 
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punctuated equilibrium account of waves better.  In a Paretian world, the past is not a good 
predictor of the future, small causes can have big effects (or large influences can lead to 
insignificant outcomes), and large earthquakes, stock market crashes, torrential floods and mass 
epidemics occur often.3  Likewise, M&A waves are hard to predict, their purported causes are 
disproportionately small to the wave effect, and they are non-trivial and extreme events.          
But how can we show that M&A waves hew to a CAS model?  By observing a Paretian 
power law distribution for the wave system.  Like a hunter inferring the existence of a game 
animal by observing its characteristic footprints in mud or snow,  Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld 
(1987, 1988) originally described the spatial and temporal “fingerprint” of the SOC state as “1/f 
noise,” or the power law distribution (also known as Zipf’s law or the Pareto distribution).  Some 
real-world power laws are shown in Figure 3.  In geophysics, for every 1000 earthquakes of 
magnitude 4 on the Richter scale, there are 100 magnitude-5 earthquakes, 10 of magnitude 6, and 
so on (Johnston & Nava, 1985).  A similar mathematical relationship holds for pulsar glitches 
(Morley & García-Pelayo, 1993).  Pulsars are spinning neutron stars, and glitches happen when 
the pulsar’s rotation changes suddenly.  The relationship of a glitch’s size to its frequency of 
occurrence follows a power law.  Benoit Mandelbrot recorded the number of months in which 
cotton prices changed from the prior month by 10% – 20%, 5% - 10%, and so on.  The 
relationship of the number of months to percent variation follows a power law (Mandelbrot, 
1963).  Raup (1986) plotted the extinction intensity during the Phanerozoic Period to the number 
of extinctions during that time, an exercise which generated a power law distribution.  Brunk 
(2002) hypothesized that societies regularly collapse through wars in a nonlinear, self-organized 
                                                 
3  In other words, traditional statistical analysis is Gaussian; a power law distribution reflects a Paretian dynamic.    
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critical process, as shown in log-plotting war deaths to their frequency.  Electricity blackouts are 
often attributed as evidence of SOC.  Carreras, Newman, Dobson and Poole (2004) observed that 
the number n of North American customers from 1984 to 1998 subject to blackouts plotted 
against the number of blackouts with more than n customers followed a power law.
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The power law, Zipf’s law and Pareto distribution are mathematically equivalent.  Zipf 
(1949) initially examined the “size” or frequency of words in an English text.  Zipf's Law states 
that the size of the rth largest occurrence of the event is inversely proportional to its rank:  
y ~r-b,        
where b is usually unity (i.e., one).  Economist Vilfredo Pareto examined the distribution of 
wealth in an economy, and Pareto’s law is given in terms of the cumulative distribution function, 
i.e. the number of events larger than x is an inverse power of x:  
P[X > x] ~ x-k. 
Zipf and Pareto laws involve inverted axes.  For Zipf, rank and size are on x- and y-axes, 
respectively, whereas for Pareto the two are reversed.  So if the rank exponent is b, i.e. y ~ r-b in 
Zipf, then the Pareto exponent is 1/b such that r ~ y-1/b.   
In turn, a power law is the probability distribution function associated with the 
cumulative distribution function of Pareto’s Law, or 
P[X = x] ~ x-(k+1) = x-a. 
Since the power law is a derivation of Pareto’s Law, the power law exponent is 1+1/b (Adamic, 
2000). 
The power law exponent can be informative, but because it may be generated from 
different mechanisms its value fluctuates.  Zipf posited “the principle of least effort,” or the idea 
of individuals trying to minimize their efforts, as the stochastic mechanism reflecting the 
author’s idiosyncrasies that generate the word frequencies to produce a rank exponent of one.  
Yet Simon (1955) claimed that the Zipf exponent is directly related to the probability that a new 
word which had never appeared before is added to the text.  Thus, the rank exponent may not be 
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one.  In distinction, Pareto’s law emerges from the many interactions among a society of 
economic actors, and deserves a less statistical mechanism than Zipf’s.  Finally, SOC expresses 
dynamical processes, like competition for resources in an ecology, and thus no optimal 
mathematical derivation of the power law exists, only evidence via “cellular automata” like Bak 
et al.’s (1987) sand piles.  Therefore, the interpretation of the value of the exponent is ultimately 
context dependent.4 
Power law-distributed M&A waves would imply that they are SOC and that a CAS 
model is a good fit for them.  Because power laws imply systemic instability vis-à-vis SOC (a 
known mechanism for generating complexity) (Bak, 1996), SOC waves would therefore be 
mechanisms for dissipating the accumulated tension of long-range forces in the M&A system, 
returning it to dynamic equilibrium in a non-linear fashion.  Additionally, waves would share the 
same underlying mechanism generating complex behavior as in avalanches for sand piles, 
earthquakes for tectonic plates, glitches for pulsars and price variations for commodities markets.  
 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
I first obtained an M&A time-series, and then identified M&A waves for a Zipf plot.  
                                                 
4     In some cases, as in the size distribution of nuclear accidents, the rank slope should be one because human 
planners keep the expected cost of an accident constant when investing resources into safety measures,.  In contrast, 
the power law distributions for connectivities in social networks emerge from the finding that the probability of 
being influenced by or imitating others depends on the number of neighbors doing something (Watts, 1999), and so 
the exponent differs for each specific network.   
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2.3.1 Obtaining U.S. M&A data 
Town’s (1992) z-scores covering 1895:1-1989:1 is one of the few complete historical 
M&A time-series covering aggregate U.S. industrial M&A.5  I added z-scores from 1989:2–
2008:2, and in doing so I sought consistency with the four series comprising Town’s (1992): 
Nelson (1959) 1895:1–1919:4; Thorp , 1920:1–1954:4; the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 
Large Merger Series 1955:1–1979:4; and Mergers and Acquisitions Magazine 1980:1–1989:1.  
Each source, except for the non-appraised Thorp series, differed on the following categories: (1) 
public vs. private transactions; (2) whole or partial deals; (3) U.S. or non-U.S. buyers; (4) 
announcement vs. completed/effective date; (5) degree of industry inclusion.  
1) Public transactions only.  All series except for M&A magazine included only  
publicly listed firms, so I excluded private transactions.    
2) 100% whole M&A deals.  Nelson utilized whole firm disappearances; FTC did not 
distinguish between full and majority deals; and M&A magazine included deals of 5% 
ownership or more changing hands.  I chose 100% whole ownership deals, since M&As should 
represent a significant shift in the market for corporate control.    
3) U.S. and non-U.S. buyers of U. S. targets.  Nelson mentioned no cross-border deals, 
but FTC and M&A magazine included non-U.S. buyers.  Furthermore, U.S. M&A by non-U.S. 
buyers represented an increasingly significant portion of the M&A market from 1989-2008.    
                                                 
5  The data is available at Research Papers in Economics (RePEc): http://ideas.repec.org/p/boc/bocins/merger.html 
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4) Announcement date (of completed deals).  Nelson, FTC and M&A magazine were 
based on announcements in the financial press, and SDC provided announcement dates.  I 
included completed announced deals since Nelson considered long-standing firm disappearances, 
FTC took into account consummated deals, and M&A Magazine removed cancelled deals.  
5) All industries.  Manufacturing and mining for Nelson and FTC comprised most of the 
U.S. economy then (although this is debatable toward the end of FTC).  M&A magazine 
included all industries in its universe of firms.   Thus, I included all industries for 1989-2008 to 
capture the overall economy.   
I then normalized and standardized the raw data.  SDC records corporate transactions of 
$1 million and over from 1979–1992, and all deals from 1993-present. Coverage in SDC from 
1979-1982 is spotty, and not all items were available.  Therefore, for 1983:1-1992:4 I divided the 
number of M&As by the yearly number of active U.S. corporations with assets above US $1 
million, and for 1993:1-2008:1, by the yearly number of all active U.S. corporations.6  I 
standardized the two series (1983:1-1992:4 and 1993:1-2008:2) per the equation 
 
y
y
y
y
n 


   
where yt  is the series and μy and σy are the sample mean and standard deviation of yt, respectively.  
Figure 4 shows the resulting time-series of aggregate U.S. M&A activity from 1895 to 2008. 
                                                 
6  I obtained data on corporations 1994–2007 from the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=170544,00.html.    
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Figure 4.  Time Series of Aggregate U.S. M&A activity, 1895-2008 
 
 
Sources: 1895:1–1989:1:  Town, RJ.   1992.   Merger waves and the structure of merger and acquisition time-series.   
Journal of Applied Econometrics 7: S83-S100.   1989:2 – 2008:2:  Securities & Data Company (SDC) database 
published by Thomson Financial. 
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Defining a wave proved to be an arbitrary process.  Carow et al. (2004) identified M&A 
waves from inception to peak and back down in six-year windows.  Harford (2005) compared the 
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50% from peak year, in six-year windows.  In my search, I avoided time windows and 
simulations in favor of a more rigorous approach.  
I employed strucchange in R (Bai & Perron, 2003; Zeileis, Kleiber, Kramer, & Hornik, 
2003; Zeileis, Leisch, Hornik, & Kleiber, 2002) which tests for structural change in linear 
regression models.  For Figure 4, it records significant shifts in the mean of the series but ignores 
random noise.  I defined an M&A wave as a significant upward structural change from a baseline 
z = 0 M&A activity to a peak, with a subsequent significant decrease below z =0.  The minimum 
wave length was set at three quarters (beginning, middle and end).  Strucchange produced 27 
“breakpoint” quarters where mean shifts occurred, creating 28 segments.  I identified changes in 
the series mean from negative to positive and back to negative.  A wave began with the quarter 
after the breakpoint separating a negative from a positive segment.  The wave ended with the 
breakpoint quarter (inclusive) preceding the next negative-mean segment.  At one point a 
negative trough preceded a positive peak, descended to a positive trough, and then increased to a 
positive peak before descending to a negative-mean trough.  Therefore, the first wave ended at 
the breakpoint quarter (inclusive) separating the first positive-mean peak and the positive-mean 
trough.  The second wave began with the quarter after the breakpoint separating the positive-
mean trough from the second peak.  Consequently, no overlap existed between the waves, and 
they were not adjacent to each other.         
For wave size, I considered amplitude (highest z-score), duration (length in quarters), a 
combination of amplitude and duration, and intensity (average z-score).  For Zipf’s Law, I 
ranked the waves by intensity from largest to smallest, placing “1” first, and plotted rank to size.  
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2.4 RESULTS 
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, a chronological ordering of M&A waves 
ranked by size. 
 
 
Table 1.  Chronological Ordering of U.S. M&A Waves with Various Rankings 
 
Wave period Amplitude 
(z) 
Duration 
(qtr) 
Combined 
Rank 
Intensity 
(ݖ̅) 
1898:1-1902:4 6.012 (1) 20 (4) 1 1.326 
 
1.274 
 
1.793 
 
0.012 
 
1.070 
 
1.819 
 
0.265 
 
0.960 
1920:1– 1921:1 1.572 (7) 5 (7) 7 
1925:4– 1931:2 4.045 (2) 23 (3) 2 
1943:4– 1947:4 .681 (8) 17 (5) 5 
1954:4– 1955:3 2.001 (6) 4 (8) 6 
1967:2 – 1970:4 4.062 (3) 15 (6) 4 
1981:1– 1989:3 3.146 (4) 35 (1) 1 
1994:3– 2001:2 2.215 (5) 28 (2) 3 
 
Note: Ranks in parentheses. 
 
 
Strucchange dates the historical M&A waves more accurately than anecdotal evidence: 
1898:1–1902:4, 1925:4–1931:2, 1967:2–1970:4, 1981:1–1989:3 and 1994:3–2001:2.  For 
amplitude, the 1900s wave is the largest, with the 1920s wave placing second, the 1960s in third, 
and the 1980s and 1990s finishing fourth and fifth, respectively.  For duration, the 1980s wave is 
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the longest, the 1990s wave second longest, the 1920s wave in third and the 1900s comes in 
fourth.  The 1960s comes in sixth, with a post-WWII wave in fifth place.  Missing from the 
accounts of Bruner (2004), Ravenscraft (1987) and Scherer & Ross (1990)—M&A scholars who 
list the same five large M&A waves—are spikes in 1920-1921 and 1954-1955 that admittedly 
rank lowest.     
Thus, the amplitude and duration rankings are at odds with each other and with historical 
accounts.  But when I rank amplitude and duration together equally for a “combined ranking,” a 
more congruent historical picture emerges, as shown in Table 1: tied for first, (1) 1900s and 
1980s, (3) 1990s, (4) 1960s and (5) 1920s.7  The last three smallest waves—1920:1–1921:1, 
1943:4–1947:4 and 1954:4–1955:3—are mentioned in Nelson (1959), and corroborated by Town 
(1992), who further adds 1960:1–1960:2 and 1962:1–1962:2.  These last two, not listed by the 
other scholars, were not detected by strucchange because the minimum wave length was three 
quarters. 
To combine the amplitude and duration metrics into a general intensity ranking I 
averaged the z-scores of the quarters comprising each wave.  The results, shown in the right 
column of Table 1, reveal that the largest wave is ݖ̅ = 1.819 and the smallest is ݖ̅ =.012.  Figure 5 
shows Zipf’s law for M&A waves by intensity on log-log paper, revealing the power law 
signature, a straight line of negative slope. 
                                                 
7 To combine the two rankings, I first compared both for each wave, and chose the higher of the two to represent the 
wave rank.  In the case of a tie between two waves, I gave precedence to the wave for which the second-category 
rank was higher.  For example, the 1920s wave ranked second in amplitude and third in duration, while the 1990s 
wave ranked fifth in amplitude and second in duration.  By ranking with the higher number, these two waves were 
tied for second.  But because the 1920’s wave was ranked third and the 1990’s wave was ranked fifth in the 
secondary category, the former was ranked second, and the 1990’s wave placed third.   
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 In order to determine the equation for the line in Figure 5, I follow the procedure in the 
Appendix.  I start with the sixth largest wave as ݔ௠௜௡= .960.  With Equations (1) and (2), I obtain 
a = 4.032.  Working backwards, I find Zipf’s rank exponent b = .330.  With Equations (3) and 
(4) I calculate C = 2.678.  Thus the equation for the power law is 
࢟ ൌ ૛. ૟ૠૡ࢞ି.૜૜૙. 
To interpret this equation, I use the cumulative distribution function of Equation (1) in 
the Appendix.  Thus, the probability of a wave greater than the largest wave in U.S. history (i.e., 
the area under the log-normal curve to the right of ݖ̅ = 1.819) is ૛.૟ૠૡ૝.૙૜૛ି૚
	
(1.819)-(4.032 - 1) = .144, or 
14.4%.  In turn, the probability of a wave greater than the smallest wave in U.S. history (i.e., the 
area under the log-normal curve to the right of ݖ̅ = .960) is ૛.૟ૠૡ૝.૙૜૛ି૚ ሺ. ૢ૟૙ሻିሺ૝.૙૜૛ି૚ሻ ൌ	1.00, or 
100%.  Therefore, the probability of a wave with a size within the range of recorded U.S. history 
is 1 – .144 = .856, or 85.6%. 
In post-hoc analysis, I instituted a different wave definition to increase the sample size 
for the recently developed curve-fitting procedure of Clauset, Shalizi & Newman (2009) which 
determines the best-fitting distribution to a data set.  I defined a wave as any undulation of the 
time-series from a negative z-score to a positive z-score and then back to a negative z-score, 
which increased the sample size to N = 44.  Using MATLAB, I obtained x-min = .2135 for an 
equation of the new power law: y = 1.8523 x-2.2745.  The goodness-of-fit test between the data and 
the power law produced a Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic = .104, p = .254, suggesting that the 
power law distribution is indeed a good fit to my data.   
 
  
37 
 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
I described the population of U.S. firms as a complex adaptive system.   I then suggested 
Bak et al.’s (1987) self-organized criticality construct as a generative mechanism for M&A 
waves.  I also compared the M&A system to a biological ecosystem displaying the evolutionary 
dynamic of punctuated equilibrium.  Afterwards, I introduced the “fingerprint” of SOC 
phenomena, the power law distribution, and observed such a distribution for M&A waves.  
Finally, I calculated that the probability of a wave larger than the most intense M&A wave in 
recorded history was close to 15%.   
 
2.5.1 Limitations 
 Here I consider my study’s limitations.  Currently, Paretian dynamics do not admit of the 
same range of formal tests as that available for Gaussian statistics (such as tests of linearity and 
normality).  Indeed, finding proper tests for a distribution’s fit to a power law distribution, like 
Clauset et al.’s (2009) is an active area of research.  Furthermore, many rank/frequency plots 
often follow power laws primarily in the tail of the distribution.  The only alternative in such 
cases is to collect a sample size of waves large enough to analyze and test their distribution.  
However, over a 113-year period strucchange only produced eight waves, of which two were 
appropriately discarded.  And, given that the six remaining M&A waves clearly matched other 
scholarly and anecdotal accounts, my method properly generated the correct data structure.  Even 
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the post-hoc analysis with a larger sample size failed to offer an absolute, definitive conclusion.  
Furthermore, Clauset et al.’s (2009) procedure is only a curve-fitting exercise, and says little 
about the underlying mechanism generating the distribution of the data.  Notwithstanding the 
exploratory nature of my investigation, I feel that the CAS model has much to offer.  Some of 
those insights I share below. 
 
2.5.2 Embracing Existing Theory 
A CAS interpretation of M&A waves can serve to further inform previous theories.  For 
example, for the capital markets thesis, perhaps the stock market is also a CAS whose  aggregate 
patterns include emergent bubbles and crashes (Sornette, 2003).  If the M&A and stock markets 
are intricately connected, as the sand pile metaphor suggests, perhaps both oscillate nonlinearly 
from frozen inactive states to hot disordered states in a predator/prey type dynamic.   
For the industry shock thesis, shocks do happen, but perhaps they are not the primary 
cause, just as the cracking of the earth’s crust is the more visible external trigger for earthquakes 
while the underlying friction of tectonic plates is the less obvious but more fundamental reason.8  
Analogously, an industry shock may hasten a wave as the more visible, but ultimately less 
important, precursor.  Instead, evolutionary pressures in the firm ecology that have built up over 
time are the less visible, but more fundamental, triggers.  
                                                 
8  Similarly, some evolutionary biologists have suggested that an exogenous meteorite impact caused the dinosaurs’ 
extinction, but arguably the dinosaurs were by then already becoming extinct (Bak, 1996).  Rather than being the 
prime mover, a meteorite impact hastened extinction.   
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Regarding efficiency and rationality of the shock and misvaluation theses, complexity 
theory suggests that for M&A waves, firm behavior is irrationally herd-like, as in an avalanche 
when the grains in a sand pile naturally slide and fall together.  But for non-wave periods, 
neoclassical efficiency and competition hold, as in the stillness of the pile as grains are added 
one-by-one (which is explainable by classical physics).  At the SOC state, when the ecology of 
firms (like the sand pile) is just barely stable with respect to further perturbations, firms 
cooperate and compete in adapting to the environment. 
A CAS model can also generate industry waves lacking in the misvaluation thesis.  The 
biological metaphor shows how mass extinctions (aggregate M&A waves) begin with some 
organisms (firms) achieving evolutionary fitness to become their species’ (industry’s) 
progenitors.  Soon after, predator and prey species (industries along the value chain) become 
endangered (via vertical integration).  Meanwhile, fitter organisms establish relationships with 
other, formerly uninvolved prey species (i.e., (un)related industries suitable for diversification).  
Thus, industry waves occur with aggregate waves. 
Additionally, a CAS model agrees with the behavioral theory’s conception of firms as 
open, goal-directed systems that utilize M&As as adaptive responses to organizational slack and 
falling performance, like the adaptive schema CAS use to direct and modify behavior to shifting 
environments.  Such heuristics are not consciously derived per se, but are not purely instinctual 
either.  Instead, they represent the vibrancy of SOC. 
Finally, for sociological theories, Watts (1999) observed that in “small-world” networks, 
the distribution of connections between actors follows a power law.  Such a structure allows 
small local changes to generate large global cataclysms, so that a single M&A may cascade 
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throughout an interlocked business community.  A CAS model may also suggest that fringe 
actors and financial innovations (Stearns & Allan, 1996) appear when the business network is 
SOC, as when the slope of a sand pile is SOC right before an avalanche. 
 
2.5.3 Connecting the CAS Model to Historical Waves 
To bolster my case for a CAS model, I correlate each M&A wave theory’s driver or 
mechanism with an event from the five historical U.S. M&A waves, as shown in Table 2. 
Macroeconomists points to the positive correlation between stock and M&A markets.  In 
Table 2, the time period of each M&A wave corresponds to a period of elevated stock prices.  
For neoclassical economists, shocks generate periods of asset reallocation via M&A.  
Table 2 reveals some distinctive shocks preceding each M&A wave. 
Behavioral finance scholars mention firm securities’ arbitrage causing an inefficient 
market to rise astronomically.  Table 2 reveals such an occurrence for each historical wave.    
The behavioral theory of the firm describes (1) organizational adaptation to performance 
feedback leading to (2) distinctive target search.  Table 2 correlates each wave to one of each. 
Finally, sociological explanations posit (1) fringe actors and (2) financial innovations 
prior to M&A waves spreading via (3) a change in corporate governance.  I provide examples of 
each in the table. 
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Table 2.  Table of M&A Wave Drivers Correlated with People and Events of the Five Historical U.S. M&A Waves 
Theory Theoretical 
Variable 
Wave 1
1898-1903 
Wave 2
1925-1931 
Wave 3 
1967-1970 
Wave 4
1983-1989 
Wave 5
1994-2000 
Capital 
markets 
Period of 
rising stock 
prices  
Between Panic of 
1893 & Panic of 
1907 
Roaring Twenties 
until Great 
Depression
The Go Go Years 1970s stagflation to 
market crash, 
October 1987
Between Recession 
of 1991 to 9/11 
Industry 
shocks 
Economic, 
regulatory or 
technological 
shocks 
Electricity; Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 
1890; McKinley 
Tariff of 1890
Automobile; 
Clayton Act of 
1914; assembly line 
production 
Jet service; Celler-
Kefauver Act of 
1950; Baby Boomer 
consumer demand
Microprocessor; 
Reagan Tax Act of 
1986; Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act of 1976
Internet; 
Deregulation of key 
industries; Lax 
antitrust enforcement 
Firm 
misvaluation 
Plausible 
mechanism 
Overcapitalization; 
watered stock 
Oversubscription of 
public securities 
Consolidation of 
corporate income 
tax statements 
without penalty 
Firms’ low PE ratios 
& borrowed money 
Difficulty of valuing 
“Dot com” ventures 
Behavioral Theory-in-
use 
Vertical integration; 
Search for 
monopoly 
Vertical integration; 
Search for 
oligopolistic 
advantage
Corporate 
diversification 
Value-based strategy; 
“Market for 
corporate control” 
theories
Pursuit of global 
scale 
Sociological 
 
Board-level 
factors 
Elite networks (e.g., 
the Simmons dinner 
of 1900 & creation 
of U.S. Steel) 
Board interlocks 
(e.g., General 
Motors & DuPont) 
Firms tied to banks 
in friendly, NOT 
predatory M&A 
(Palmer, Xueguang, 
Barber, & Soysal, 
1995)
Focal firms 
connected to 
acquiring sister firms 
engage in more 
M&A (Haunschild, 
1993)
Diversity initiatives: 
adding women & 
people of color 
Key actors  John R. Dos Passos: 
J. P. Morgan; 
Andrew Carnegie 
Alfred P. Sloan; 
John Raskob; 
Donaldson Brown 
Harold Geneen, 
Jimmy Ling 
Boone Pickens; 
Michael Milken 
Sandy Weil; Steve 
Case 
Financial & 
legal 
innovations 
Issuance of common 
& preferred stock 
Financial ratios 
(e.g., ROI, ROE) & 
flexible budgeting  
Price-to-earnings 
ratio arbitrage 
Leveraged buyout; 
Junk bond financing; 
Hostile takeover 
Expansion of 
Venture Capital and 
Private Equity 
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2.5.4 Managerial Implications and Future Research 
Other than as academic curiosities, M&A waves also contain value-creation potential.  
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) observed that acquiring-firm shareholders gained $24 
billion from 1991 through 1997—the start of the 1990s M&A wave—before losing $240 billion 
at the end of the wave, from 1998 through 2001.  Given this and the sizable probability of yet 
another large M&A wave, it is important to know when the next one will happen.  Yet at first 
glance the managerial relevance of complexity theory seems limited.  The indeterminacy of CAS 
makes prediction difficult, and their variability makes feasible only a narrative account of 
distinguishable events post mortem (Bak, 1996). 
But as Goldstone (1991) noted, geologists may not be able to predict the precise number 
and location of fossils in a particular sort of rock, but can predict the types of fossils and their 
rough proportions if they know that the rock was formed at a time when certain species lived.  
Likewise, waves are unique in terms of timing, amplitude, duration and strategic motivation, thus 
precluding exact prediction, but they do share certain recognizable, generic patterns that 
managers can identify as the patterns emerge before an oncoming M&A wave.  Scholars can 
learn to identify such robust processes (Goldstone, 1991), which signify that across different 
historical contexts, (1) similar initial conditions confront (2) actors, who react in similar ways, 
leading to (3) similar outcomes.  Robust processes, singly or in concert, may generate small, 
medium and very large M&A waves, and timely adaptation to them may involve identifying 
such processes.   
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Such robust processes may not necessarily be predictable or controllable, but they may be 
anticipated and shaped.  Thus, from a managerial viewpoint, it may be more important to strive 
for situational awareness combined with fast response rather than for (an unattainable) predictive 
capacity.  This suggests that, like the investor who does not predict when the market has 
bottomed out to make an investment, but rather ascertains that the market has in fact bottomed 
out before then investing, managers could try to be less like early movers, and more like fast 
followers.  Although value-creation may be less intense, value-capture may be more feasible.    
Other compelling managerial implications come from the analogies to the sand pile.  Bak 
et al. (1988) noted that the angle of repose is higher for a pile of wet sand so that as the water 
evaporates, small and large avalanches occur at random places on the pile.  If “sticky,” wet sand 
grains are more resistant to avalanches, perhaps firms with many inter-organizational linkages—
“sticky linkages”—are more capable of withstanding takeovers during M&A waves.  Sticky 
linkages, like equity strategic alliances, are a set of cross-shareholdings between a focal firm and 
its broad constellation of stakeholders, like Japanese keiretsu firms with vertical relationships 
connecting all factors of production, and horizontal relationships with owner banks and trading 
companies.  In contrast, U.S. firms may be embedded in an atomistic social, economic, legal, 
political and institutional “fabric” loosely comprised of antagonistic constituencies.  This implies 
that fostering sticky linkages among U.S. entities may ameliorate the likelihood of disruptive 
acquisition during M&A waves by weaving a strong, localized “safety net” comprised of law 
firms, investment banks, shareholders, the government, suppliers, and customers.  By aligning 
their interests, stakeholders may generate in-group keiretsu-like biases that keep opportunistic 
“outsider” acquirers at bay and foster “thick” internal cross-ownership structures. Of course, 
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existing financial market and anti-trust regulations have the express purpose of acting as a 
counterweight to such embedding tendencies – leading both to robust markets for corporate 
control and to M&A waves. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Prior research on M&A waves, drawn from often conflicting scholarly disciplines, has 
produced reductionist models that throw little light on the emergent properties of such waves.  
Our CAS model provides a more integrated account, and generates a useful metaphor to facilitate 
managerial understanding and preparation for M&A waves.  While but an initial step, we hope 
our work enriches future studies on this fascinating and important phenomenon. 
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3.0  ESSAY TWO: SURF’S UP: ROBUST PROCESSES IN MERGER AND 
ACQUISITION WAVES 
After a century of debate, merger and acquisition (M&A) waves remain a mystery to 
scholars and practitioners alike.  Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) and McNamara, 
Haleblian and Dykes (2008) noted that the beginnings of M&A waves create value, making it 
important to “see them coming.”  In the first essay, I observed that the size-distribution of 
aggregate U.S. M&A waves follows a power law, yet it is unclear why most waves sputter out 
while a handful has explosive potential.  Given the theoretical interest in explaining this 
empirical signature, along with the practical import of understanding how M&A waves form, a 
process explanation of them would serve academics and managers well.  
My statistical power-law description supported a complex adaptive systems (CAS) model 
of M&A waves, which attempted to integrate prior economic, behavioral and sociological M&A 
wave theories.  Thus, an explanation of M&A wave formation consistent with a CAS model 
holds great promise.  But because of small sample size and the indeterminacy of CAS, the 
mainstream method of management science—detailed predictions followed by reproducible 
experiments (Bak, 1996)—was infeasible for my research aim.  I therefore embraced process 
tracing, a qualitative, within-case analytical technique that uniquely combines elements of the 
case-study and history.  By analyzing how a past event occurred, process tracing seeks to make 
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causal inferences based on one historical case.  My analysis focused on the Great Merger Wave 
of 1898-1903 because this first and largest wave in recorded U.S. history was not adulterated by 
“spill over” effects from a previous M&A wave, and the dynamics of wave formation were more 
visible in this extreme case than in a less dramatic context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007).  
Process tracing evidence is encapsulated in robust processes, as distinct from law-like 
generalizations that hold independent of historical context (Goldstone, 1991).  By identifying and 
explaining connections among many details of the historical record that were previously 
unrecognized or not understood, a robust process tries to show that, across historical contexts: (1) 
similar initial conditions confront (2) actors, who react in similar ways, to produce (3) similar 
outcomes.  With the process tracing of journal articles, government publications, and books 
spanning a number of theoretical disciplines, my single-case research design for the Great 
Merger Wave suggested that: (1) the gradual maturation of a privatized, market-expanding and 
well-financed transportation network motivates (2a) politicians to adopt laissez faire regulation; 
(2b) industrialists to engage in cutthroat competition, and (2c) financiers to undertake firm 
securities arbitrage, generating (3) a sudden burst of consolidation.   
The following sections provide a literature review, summarize the methodology, explain 
the sampling procedure, describe the historical data, outline the results and discuss implications. 
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3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1.1 Previous M&A Wave Theories 
Current explanations of M&A waves include three economic theories, and behavioral and 
sociological accounts.  Macroeconomists posit that capital markets, indicated by stock market 
prices, drive M&A activity (Nelson, 1959).  Neoclassical economists suggest that technological 
shocks to industries generate M&A waves as periods of asset reallocation (Gort, 1969; Mitchell 
and Mulherin, 1996).  Behavioral economists theorize that the arbitraging of acquirer and target 
securities drives an inefficient M&A market to rise and then collapse (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Rhodes-Kopf and Viswanathan, 2004).  Behavioral theorists of the firm explain M&A activity 
through the satisficing of boundedly rational managers, who react to performance feedback with 
search for acquisition targets (Iyer and Miller, 2008).  Sociologists argue that a permissive 
regulatory environment enables the M&A strategy to spread from fringe actors to the business 
community via board interlocks (Haunschild, 1993; Stearns and Allan, 1996). 
Yet these observations come from competing theoretical paradigms, and anomalies exist.  
For macroeconomists, M&A boom-bust patterns are left unexplained.  Neoclassical economic 
theories assume market efficiency and manager rationality, which are problematic to behavioral 
researchers.  Behavioral finance scholars’ assumption of inefficient markets conflicts with 
macroeconomic and neoclassical assumptions of efficiency.  For Carnegie school behavioralists, 
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it is unclear how bounded rationality and satisficing are reconcilable with economic rationality 
and utility maximizing.  Finally, sociologists do not identify the drivers of social diffusion 
mechanisms, nor why fringe actors consistently appear.  Thus, a more integrated account of 
M&A wave patterns would be an important contribution. 
 
3.1.2 Complexity theory and M&A waves 
In the first essay, I turned to complexity theory, or the study of CAS, in search of an 
integrated model.  A CAS model suggests that M&A waves are macro-level patterns emerging 
from micro-level resource-competition in an ecology of firms.  This competition endogenously 
generates pressure and tension in the ecology until at a critical point an M&A wave occurs, 
dissipating the pent-up instability in a non-linear return to dynamic equilibrium.  The critical 
point is dubbed the self-organized critical (SOC) (Bak, 1996) state.  In complex systems such as 
sand pile cellular automata, the steepening of the pile upon addition of grains leads to SOC 
avalanches.   
My first essay attempted to integrate prior M&A wave theories by analogizing from sand 
avalanches to M&A waves.  For macroeconomists, M&A booms (gradual buildup of the pile) 
alternate with M&A busts (an avalanche’s drop-off).  For neoclassical economists, industry 
shocks (multiple wind gusts) set off an M&A wave (a large avalanche).  For behavioral finance 
scholars, each new M&A (dropped grain) makes the market more inefficient (steepens the pile) 
until the deals’ true values are revealed (the SOC state), crashing the market (an avalanche).  For 
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Carnegie behavioralists, firms (grains) are uniquely goal-directed systems (obey the law of 
gravity) that respond characteristically (slide downward) to performance feedback (after being 
dislodged).  For sociologists, board interlocks (friction between grains) determines the M&A 
strategy’s diffusion (avalanche size) through the business community (sand pile), while fringe 
actors consistently return (the SOC state) preceding an M&A wave (avalanche).  While each 
model offers a plausible account of how sand grains behave, M&A waves (avalanches) cannot be 
inferred from the movements of the individual firms (sand grains), but are empirically verifiable 
phenomena that emerge at an aggregate level of analysis. 
The spatial and temporal fingerprint of CAS at the SOC state is the power law 
distribution (Bak et al., 1988).  In other words, one infers the existence of CAS by observing this 
empirical signature for a system of events, similar to how a hunter infers the existence of a game 
animal by observing its characteristic tracks in mud or snow.  Essentially a straight line of 
negative slope on double-log paper, the power law suggests that a quantity N can be expressed as 
a power of another quantity s: N(s) ~ s-a.  In natural science, the sizes of SOC avalanches are 
power law-distributed.  Similarly, in the first essay I observed that the size distribution of 
aggregate U.S. M&A waves from 1895-2008 follows a power law, thus supporting the notion 
that M&A waves are SOC phenomena in an ecology of firms conceptualized as a CAS.  Yet the 
descriptive CAS model does not explain how waves form to generate a power law size-
distribution.  For that, I introduce a method that can produce process explanations. 
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3.2 METHOD 
3.2.1 Process Tracing 
Process tracing is a within-case analytical technique that combines elements of the 
history with those of the case-study (Yin, 1994).  Like the latter, process tracing tries to answer 
the how question for a given phenomenon, while like the former, process tracing focuses on past 
events.  However, it does not make use of contemporary sources such as surveys or interviews, 
as a true case-study would, nor does it merely tell what happened, as a history might.  Rather, a 
process tracing account argues about what happened (Goldstone, 1991), i.e., it tries to explain 
how a past event came to be.  As such, it is ideally suited to my research question and 
phenomenon of interest: how the Great Merger Wave happened. 9 
  While statistical methods treat causation as a constant correlation between two variables 
(Mahoney, 2001), process tracing views causation as a hypothesized mechanism or process 
connecting variables (Bennett & Elman, 2007).  In establishing this latter form, process tracing 
attempts to validate robust processes (Goldstone, 1991), which break down into three parts: (1) a 
                                                 
9 Process tracing is undergirded by a set of ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments that can 
be labeled critical realism (Johnson & Duberley, 2000).  Ontologically, the critical realist assumes an objectivist 
position, i.e. reality exists “out there,” independent of and apart from the researcher’s sensory perceptions of it.  
Epistemologically, however, the critical realist is subjectivist, i.e., the same reality can be perceived in different 
ways, depending on the researcher’s theoretical lens.  Therefore, the critical realist advocates methodological 
pluralism, i.e. quantitative and qualitative methods have complementary strengths that, when used together, can 
produce a powerful description or explanation of a phenomenon. 
    Thus, the fact that macroeconomists, neoclassical economists, behavioral economists, Carnegie behavioralists and 
sociologists all have distinct theories of M&A waves must presuppose that there is something that they all see, yet in 
different ways.  In the first essay, I built on this philosophical foundation by negotiating the conflicting truth claims 
of these theoretical paradigms with an integrated CAS model.  My contribution here is to complement the first 
essay’s deductively obtained and quantitative CAS description of the population of M&A waves with an inductively 
generated, qualitative process explanation of just one wave.  
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set of somewhat similar initial conditions confront (2) actors who react in somewhat similar 
ways, to produce (3) somewhat similar outcomes.10  Robust processes are useful in that they can 
test a theory by invoking evidence in the historical record that is consistent with the process or 
refutes alternative explanations.  But in generating theory, robust processes relate a large number 
of details of the historical record to each other in a way that had not previously been recognized 
or understood.  By connecting historical data with prior theory, process tracing can produce a 
scholarly work of great value.  
For example, Goldstone (1991) describes Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural 
selection as a robust process: (1) reproductive competition among species with variation among 
individuals leads (2) the reproductively successful individuals to diffuse their traits throughout 
the population, giving rise to (3) new species.11  Now it is true that Darwin’s theory was 
consistent with the known fossil record, while Lamarck’s alternative evolutionary hypothesis, 
that characteristics acquired during an individual’s lifetime are inherited, was later refuted.  But 
Darwin’s theory also served to integrate a broad range of evidence from animal husbandry, 
                                                 
10 The qualification “somewhat similar” distinguishes robust processes from laws, which are the end-result of 
quantitative methods.  Laws typically “decontextualize,” i.e. hold regardless of initial conditions, always generate 
the same behaviors in actors, and always end with an exactly identical, precisely predictable result.  In contrast, 
robust processes are more like limited generalizations stating essential and necessary initial conditions that produce 
characteristic (but not precisely identical) behaviors, which result in a similar (but not exactly identical or precisely 
predictable) outcome.    
11 What makes this robust process so is that the initial condition (reproductive competition) is an essential and 
necessary contextual element of the process without which it could not proceed.  And while reproductively 
successful individuals typically diffuse their traits, sometimes this is not the case.  After all, laboratory mice do not 
experience natural selection, as their reproductive success is purposefully minimized by their owners; however, this 
exception does not invalidate the theory of evolution.  Finally, precise prediction is not at issue, since the theory 
does not claim to predict any particular new species, nor the precise time of their emergence (Goldstone, 1991).  
Contrast this process to the law of gravity, which is independent of initial conditions, i.e., the initial conditions, such 
as the masses of and distance between two gravitationally bound bodies, are simply parameters that can vary without 
affecting the operation of the law.  In other words, gravity per se operates regardless of the initial conditions.  
Furthermore, the law of gravity requires the two gravitationally bound bodies to always be attracted to each other, 
without exception.  Third, the law’s outcome, the actual movement of the bodies toward each other, can be precisely 
predicted or plotted from the initial conditions. 
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biogeography, embryology, geology and morphology.  Indeed, from Goldstone’s perspective, 
before Darwin, people knew of the fossil record and the principle of inheritance, but did not 
know how to combine them until Darwin elucidated the process of natural selection. 
 
3.2.2 Sample 
Our small-N sample consisted of the Great Merger Wave of 1898-1903, which I chose 
for a number of reasons.  Research design-wise, the sizeable amount of available historical data 
on the first M&A wave made the process-tracing analysis more productive.  Practically speaking, 
the Great Merger Wave was the largest in history in amplitude, and the largest in relation to the 
size and maturity of the contemporary economy (Town, 1992), implying the event’s great value-
creation potential and consequential importance to practitioners.  Regarding theoretical 
considerations, the Great Merger Wave, as the first wave in recorded U.S. industrial history, was 
least likely to have been adulterated by “spillover effects” from a prior wave.12  And because the 
power law distribution for M&A waves reflects Paretian dynamics which stress the importance 
of extreme or rare events, my choice of M&A wave followed the same logic.  Finally, I chose 
this outlying case  because the dynamics of the M&A wave process would be more evident in 
this case than in a less extreme context (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
                                                 
12 This was an important consideration to us since the existence of spillover effects would have complicated our 
analysis even more for an already complex, multifaceted phenomenon.  For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) 
observed that the 1980s hostile takeover wave involved efficiency-motivated bust-ups of large diversified firms that 
had initially been assembled during the 1960s conglomerate wave. 
  
53 
 
3.2.3 Data Sources 
I collected data from three archival sources: (1) books (2) journal articles (3) government 
publications.  Books involved various aspects of the Great Merger Wave (i.e., biographies of 
prominent industrialists, legal briefs of important antitrust cases, descriptions of 19th century 
technological advances, history of the modern corporation, a history of the steel industry).  The 
empirical journal articles represented a wide variety of theoretical and professional disciplines, 
including business history, law, economics, politics, sociology, finance, the Carnegie behavioral 
school and general management/strategy.  The government publications included the 1900 
Preliminary Report on Trusts and Industrial Combinations and the 1901 Report on Trusts and 
Industrial Combinations, both authored by the United States Industrial Commission.  These 
1000-plus page volumes contained narrative reviews of evidence, price lists for important 
industries, graphs of stock market prices, and Congressional testimony of prominent witnesses. 
 
3.2.4 Data Collection 
 Data collection proceeded qualitatively.13  My task was to reduce the data into 
manageable form, so that I could then select data to answer my research question (Gersick, 
1989).  While reading each document, I coded any page for which a notable event, person, 
organization, or other important milestone was mentioned, by jotting the event and its date on a 
                                                 
13  Compared to the ensuing data analysis, this particular phase was more time-intensive.   
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Post-it and affixing it on the page.  I judged the relevance of an event in two ways: (1) if the 
surrounding text described the event in terms of its extraordinary impact on business, society or 
the Great Merger Wave; or (2) if the same event was mentioned multiple times either within the 
same document or across multiple documents.  Once all the material had been coded, I then 
temporarily grouped the Post-it’s with similar information into emerging themes: technological 
developments, financial panics, stock market trends, predominant firms, famous industrialists, 
political elections, major wars, important legal decisions, contemporary social issues, and of 
course, milestone merger transactions.  Finally, I placed the Post-it’s on a rectangular poster in 
separate rows, one theme per row, from left to right in chronological order.  Figure 6 shows a 
timeline of important historical events between the American Civil War and World War One.14  
In the data section, I provide a historical narrative based on this timeline. 
                                                 
14  The choice to span an interval of time between wars was not coincidental.  Tilly (1975) writes that war has 
historically stimulated profound economic change as much as any other kind of political event.  Roy (1997) calls the 
American Civil War the country’s most traumatic war and the precipitating event for the creation of the corporate 
infrastructure as it is known today.  Correspondingly, the United States’ entry into World War One signaled the 
country’s progress from a fractious band of agrarian states to an internally unified industrial power.  
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Figure 6.  Timeline of Major Events for the Great Merger Wave 
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3.2.5 Data Analysis 
Data analysis (process tracing) proceeded qualitatively.15  Although I knew that the Great 
Merger Wave was the clear outcome of our robust process, I still lacked the initial conditions, the 
main actors, and their reactions.  Therefore, the process tracing analysis attempted to identify 
these missing components.  Working iteratively with (1) the historical narrative, (2) prior M&A 
wave theories, and (3) the sand pile CAS metaphor, I sought to generate an empirically 
grounded, theoretically informed and metaphorically accurate robust process (Ashcraft, 2001; 
Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Pratt, Rockmann, & Kaufmann, 2006; Pratt & Rosa, 2003). 
To identify the initial condition, I first treated each theme of Post-it’s as an analogue of a 
prior M&A wave theory’s driver.16  For example, technological developments (the Bessemer 
process, open-hearth furnace, refrigerated railroad car) were considered technological shocks in 
the neoclassical economic framework.  I then matched each analogue to a logical aspect of the 
sand pile metaphor (e.g., multiple wind gusts through the sand pile).  But the sand pile metaphor 
did not rank the theoretical drivers in order of importance (i.e., wind gusts are equally influential 
in generating an avalanche as falling sand grains, the increasing steepness of the pile, the friction 
between sand grains, or the physical properties of the grains).  Furthermore, the initial condition 
needed to be consistent with the fundamental process underlying CAS (i.e., a long period of 
                                                 
15 Compared to data collection, this data analysis phase was the more labor-intensive.   
16  A sixth driver, Bittlingmayer’s (1985) antitrust policy, was placed under the sociological M&A wave theory as 
part of a permissive regulatory framework. 
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gradual build-up prior to the quickly dissipative avalanche).  Additionally, my first essay 
discussed the connectivity of sand grains as a fundamental factor permitting the avalanche to 
form.  I subsequently reverted back to the data, which obliged me to look for an event that slowly 
developed, physically connected firms together, and logically preceded the Great Merger Wave.  
These conditions pointed to the maturation of a transcontinental railroad network,  which in fact 
Chandler (1959) already attributed the creation of a national market to. 
Identifying the relevant actors also involved informed choices.  The task was to select the 
relevant data that would answer my research question (Gersick, 1989).  I knew that prior M&A 
wave theories provide different units of analysis, at different levels of analysis: capital markets 
(aggregate), exogenous shocks (industry), acquirer and target management (deal), focal 
managers (firm), and politico-legal environment (sociological field).  But all of these levels and 
units merited consideration since the CAS model was integrative and CAS are multi-level 
phenomena.  So in the interests of abstracting from the complex reality, I first collapsed the Post-
it themes, which were already matched to their theoretical analogues, into broader disciplinary 
rubrics sympathetic to CAS models: economics (Carnegie behavioral), finance (macroeconomic 
and behavioral financial) and politics/law (sociology).  I then collapsed the levels of analysis of 
these three major disciplines into their micro- (individual), meso- (group) and macro- 
(institutional) level counterparts.17  However, I focused on the macro-level institutions, since 
aggregate M&A waves are macro-level phenomena.   
                                                 
17 The micro- (individual) level actors included the following: (1) industrialists, (2) investment bankers, and (3) 
politicians and municipal governments.  At a meso- (group) level, I observed the following analogues: (1) firms, (2) 
investment banks, and (3) governors and state governments.  At the macro or institutional level, the U.S. economy 
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The final part was to record the actors’ reactions to the initial condition.18  I first sought to 
know what aspects of the railroads affected our actors singularly.  With information in the 
historical record on various aspects of the railroads’ gradual development, as well as the 
relationships of prominent individuals in economics, finance and politics/law (and their group- 
and institution-level counterparts) to the railroads, I concluded that market-connecting, financial 
innovation, and privatization were important aspects.  From this, knowledge of these actors’ 
typical behaviors (economic actors compete and merge, financial actors organize and promote 
deals, politico-legal actors regulate M&A activity), generated a complete picture.  Figure 7 
illustrates my robust process, which I discuss in the results section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
was the economic actor, Wall Street the financial actor, and the Federal government and Supreme Court the politico-
legal (or “regulatory”) actor. 
18  Industrialist Andrew Carnegie began his career speculating on the railroads and then selling steel to them in order 
to acquire weaker competitors (Roy, 1997).  Investment banker JP Morgan started out underwriting railroad 
securities and organizing railroad mergers, then turned to promoting industrial mergers.  The Federal government 
initially subsidized railroad development, until the bungling of these public works projects popularized laissez faire 
ideology and the subsequent privatization of the railroads. 
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Figure 7.  A Process Model for the Great Merger Wave 
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3.3 DATA 
3.3.1 The American Civil War: 1860s 
19th century America witnessed the gradual disappearance of the Western frontier as the 
Manifest Destiny principle, that American expansion to the Pacific Ocean across the continent 
was self-evident (“Manifest”) and inexorable (“Destiny”), captured the public’s imagination.    
However, Manifest Destiny was only truly realized with the Civil War when, in its open conflict 
with the Southern states, the Federal government consolidated power by helping build the 
railroads for military transport across the Union states of the industrialized North and agrarian 
West (Roy, 1997).  As part of the war effort, the Lincoln administration’s National Banking Act 
of 1863 established a national currency and a corresponding system of nationally chartered banks 
that fostered the institutionalization of Wall Street as the center of American moneyed interests 
(Roy, 1997).  
 
3.3.2 Reconstruction: 1870s 
After the war, reconstruction established basic railroad transport between the industrial 
North, post-bellum South and the expanding West.  Indeed, the world’s first transcontinental 
railroad concluded at Promontory, Utah, in 1869.  Railroad construction required financing, and 
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over time investment bankers began to issue increasingly sophisticated railroad securities, 
including preferred stock and income, convertible and mortgage bonds (Chandler, 1965).  
Indeed, 19th-century American financial markets were exclusively comprised of railroad stocks 
and bonds, and only occasionally did less reputable industrial securities circulate (Navin & 
Sears, 1955).  The world’s largest company at the time was the Pennsylvania Railroad, initially 
run by Philadelphia merchants to secure the city’s commercial success by tapping the resources 
of the expanding west (Roy, 1997).  Meanwhile, politicians regulated the privatized railroad 
industry as the transportation networks took more civilian passengers and commercial cargo. 
 
3.3.3 The Gilded Age: 1880s 
In the 1880s, modern managerial systems developed for railroads were applied to limited 
liability stockholder corporations (Roy, 1997), as the U-form structure organized functional 
departments under single industrialists (Chandler, 1959).  Standard Oil in 1882 under John 
Rockefeller was the first organized trust issuing Standard Oil certificates in exchange for those of 
the constituent companies (Commission, 1900).  Other industrialists soon took the lead, such as 
Carnegie Steel’s Andrew Carnegie who, like Rockefeller, was often accused of receiving 
preferential treatment from railroad management via rebates and kickbacks to deliver large 
volumes of oil and steel necessary for the industrializing U.S. economy.  In 1887, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) was founded to regulate the railroads.  However, the ICC initially 
lacked the enforcement power to set rates or disallow discriminatory practices.  Resultantly, 
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constituencies beholden to the railroads—miners, farmers and small municipal governments—
pressed for reform throughout the 1890s. 
As railroads expanded and demand for steel rails skyrocketed, technological innovations 
such as the Bessemer process and the open-hearth furnace led to mass-production of steel 
(Lamoreaux, 1985).  Previously, making steel required smelting iron ore with coke, a byproduct 
of coal, to form pig iron, an intermediate product that contained too many impurities and was too 
brittle to be of much use.  The Bessemer process, developed in the 1850s but not fully utilized 
until decades later, required a steel container (a Bessemer converter) to blow air over molten pig 
iron, thus increasing temperatures and removing further impurities from the molten metal 
(Hogan, 1971).  The open-hearth furnace, also invented decades before commercialization, 
transferred heat from exhaust gases to bricks to burn impurities from pig iron; the bricks then 
heated new gases upon reverse flow of the furnace.  This process produced large quantities of 
high-grade steel and more efficiently utilized the coking fuel. 
As the country steadily grew from an agrarian society to an industrialized nation, 
runaway late 19th-century consumer demand coincided with the ascendance of a national market 
that connected urbanizing populations via the transcontinental railroads (Chandler, 1959).  
Regional markets were connected through a chain of regional branch offices with a central office 
coordinating operations from a large metropolis such as Chicago, New York or Pittsburgh.  
Firms around this time began to reach unprecedented size and scope, as cost-reduction 
efficiencies and scale economies could only be achieved through large-scale operations 
(Chandler, 1959). 
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3.3.4 The Close of the 19th Century: 1890s 
A number of pivotal events in the 1890s set the stage for the Great Merger Wave.  The 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 established the letter (but not the spirit) of the law for dealing 
with trusts.  The concurrent McKinley Tariff of 1890 and Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 
predated the Panic of 1893 and the ensuing shift of public opinion in favor of big business. 
Although the Sherman Act initially banned railroad abuses, the Supreme Court consistently 
interpreted the Act as a restriction only against “tight” industrial combinations rather than 
“loose” ones.  Loose combinations were uncomplicated prosecutions as they consisted of 
independent producers conspiring to fix prices, acts which could easily be shown as a restraint on 
competitors’ actions.  In contrast, tight combinations were much more difficult to challenge as 
they were comprised of single corporations whose mere size and market share did not necessarily 
imply restraints on the actions of other firms (Lamoreaux, 1985).  Furthermore, the E.C. Knight 
decision of 1895 implicitly absolved the Federal government of responsibility over antitrust 
matters, giving due course back to the individual states.  However, the states’ corporate charters, 
which permitted business within state lines, were ineffective against the trusts’ interstate 
commerce; and in reality, states were often beholden to the economic prowess of big business 
(Commission, 1900; Lamoreaux, 1985; Roy, 1997).  Corporations took advantage of the lax 
Federal antitrust interpretation and state-level legal loopholes, which did not receive critical 
review until the “Trust Problem” had already assumed large proportions. 
 Along with the trust question, the tariff and silver questions were of prime importance to 
late-19th century contemporaries (Bullock, 1901).  Before fiat currency, the Federal 
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government’s bimetallist policy allowed paper currency to be exchanged for gold or silver.  
Farmers and miners (who flooded precious metals markets with silver from newly-discovered 
Western mines) sought to honor debts more easily with inflated silver dollars, while Eastern 
bankers sought maximum return on loans via gold-backed currency.  Additionally, Northeastern 
commercial interests desired protection from European manufacturing, while Western agrarian 
constituencies sought to abolish protectionist policies which raised the prices of domestic goods.  
The McKinley Tariff and Sherman Silver Act were a political compromise between Republicans 
representing Eastern banking and commercial interests and Democrats representing Western 
farmers and miners.  The tariff raised ad valorem tariffs to 48.4% on manufacturing imports and 
received Democratic votes while the Sherman Silver Purchase Act received Republican support 
and raised the Federal government’s minimum purchase of silver.    
Yet the Panic of 1893 decisively derailed the U.S. economy and only intensified debates 
over bimetallism and protectionism.  With unemployment approximating 20% at its height, and 
the 800+ bank failures from 1893-1897 exceeded only by those during the Great Depression, the 
Panic of 1893 was one of the most severe depressions in U.S. history (Hoffmann, 1956).  
Hoffman mentions a large contraction in railroad investment as a primary contributing factor to 
the ensuing depression.  Manufacturing and agricultural sectors also slowed considerably 
throughout the mid-1890s.  However, investment in street railways increased throughout the 
1890s, and investment in building construction enjoyed an early, continuous rebound in 1894, 
implying that despite the worst of times, urbanization and industrialization continued unabated. 
With memories of the Panic fresh in the public’s mind, Democrats and Republicans took 
forceful stands on economic issues in the Presidential election of 1896.  Professionals, skilled 
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factory workers, well-to-do farmers and businessmen supported Robert McKinley’s Republican 
campaign by contributing a large war chest which was used to outspend the poorer Democratic 
contender William Jennings Bryan, the voice of populist agrarian sentiment and the “silverites.”  
McKinley’s Republican administration was placed in the White House, and in 1897 the Dingley 
Tariff raised tariffs further to as high as 57%.  In 1900, the Gold Standard Act de jure officially 
removed the U.S. economy fully off silver and squarely on gold-backed paper. 
 
3.3.5 The Great Merger Wave: 1898-1903 
By the dawn of the Great Merger Wave, the U.S. had emerged as one of the world’s 
leading industrialized nations.  A national market had coalesced around the railroads, as 
independent business owners were confronted by ballooning consumer demand for mass 
produced items (Lamoreaux, 1985).  Railroad financiers, firmly ensconced but no longer as 
profitable as a result of the Panic of 1893, were on the hunt for other investment opportunities. 
Staunchly pro-business Republican politicians, fresh from victory, sought opportunities to 
stimulate an economic recovery. Starting in 1898, a spike in merger activity occurred, with 
society’s moneyed interests enjoying several years of popularity, prosperity and power.   
As manufacturing began to overtake transportation as the key engine of U.S. economic 
growth, the politico-legal apparatus transferred to industrial corporations the same laissez faire 
policies that it had learned to apply to the railroads (Roy, 1997).  The E.C. Knight Supreme 
Court decision of 1895 had given “tight” combinations carte blanche to further consolidate.  
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Given this newfound permissiveness, privately owned business corporations increasingly 
challenged the Federal government’s fragile regulatory safety net.  State governments were 
economically powerless to enforce their authority of corporate charters over the trusts’ interstate 
commerce, and the lack of a Federal incorporation law allowed the new corporations to flout the 
common-law provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Bittlingmayer, 1985; Lamoreaux, 
1985).  The McKinley and Dingley Tariffs had ostensibly protected the U.S. domestic 
manufacturing base, but by closing off foreign competition, they generated attractive industry 
structures that invited domestic entry, leading to price warfare between incumbents and entrants.  
As these parties fought for market share, horizontal consolidation ensued (Commission, 1900; 
Commission & House, 1901).   
The tolerance of big business by McKinley also paralleled an important legal milestone, 
the right of a corporation to own another corporation (Roy, 1997).   Opportunistic entrepreneurs 
soon saw this ruling as tacit permission to form shell companies that owned a controlling 51% 
interest in holding companies, which in turn owned majority shares in yet other companies.  
With this pyramidal structure, it became relatively simple for a small minority of business 
owners to possess controlling shares in a vast number of enterprises, thus facilitating the 
corporate board interlocks and “communities of interest” among competitors found in late-19th 
century big business (Chandler, 1959; Commission, 1900; Commission & House, 1901; 
Haunschild, 1993; Roy, 1997).  For example, the famed  “Simmons dinner” in New York City in 
December 1900 (Hogan, 1971) was a closed meeting of a small network of well-heeled 
industrialists and financiers which led to the incorporation in April 1901 of U.S. Steel, negotiated 
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by Charles Schwab (president of Carnegie Steel), sold by Andrew Carnegie to J.P. Morgan, and 
organized by Judge Elbert Gary. 
As industrialists consolidated their business empires, they utilized the financial services 
of Wall Street bankers, who underwrote the securities of the large consolidations and promoted 
the deals themselves.  By the mid-1890s, railroad securities, which had been the main trade on 
financial markets in Boston, Philadelphia and New York, were being taken over by new and 
riskier industrial stocks and bonds (Navin & Sears, 1955).  For example, of the six M&A in the 
fall of 1897 running through the summer of 1898 that were valued at a net worth of $10 million 
or more, four were put together by independent promoters operating on Wall Street (Navin & 
Sears, 1955).  They included John R. Dos Passos for American Thread Company, the Moore 
brothers for National Biscuit, and Elverton Chapman for American Malting and for Standard 
Distilling.  Promoters had discovered that arbitraging M&A deals through stock swaps between 
the constituent companies and the newly formed corporations was a quick way to generate paper 
profits.  A robust market for corporate control began to coalesce around the geographical 
location of Wall Street in lower Manhattan of New York City (Roy, 1997).   
Consolidation was an involved dealing.  Independent business owners who wished to sell 
out to a large combine approached a Wall Street promoter, who paid for the plant, property and 
equipment (or the stock) of the constituent companies with the new corporation’s securities 
supplied by financiers’ cash (Commission & House, 1901).  Beginning in 1897, independent 
promoters began issuing common alongside preferred stock to the investing public, with the 
common representing risk capital (intangible assets, or the earnings capacity of the future 
corporation) and the preferred representing investment value (tangible assets, or plant, property 
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and equipment) (Navin & Sears).  The issuance to business owners of common stock at less than 
par alongside preferred stock at par (with the remaining common up to par set aside for the 
promoter) typically meant that the preferred was worth something less than par and that the 
speculative value of the common was more than enough to make up the differential (Navin & 
Sears, 1955).  Therefore, an investor who paid $100 for a preferred-common package did so in 
the belief that he would be able to turn around and market his shares separately for a combined 
value of perhaps $110 or $115.  Promoters were thus placed in a position of risk: they were paid 
in the new corporation’s common stock left over from their negotiations with the business 
owners, and then sold their shares to the investing public for cash (Commission, 1900; 
Commission & House, 1901; Navin & Sears, 1955; Stearns & Allan, 1996). 
News spread fast, and in a few years, conservative investment bankers like J.P. Morgan, 
who had traditionally worked with reliable railroad securities, began to engage in industrial 
mergers starting with Federal Steel, which was later involved in the U.S. Steel merger (Navin & 
Sears, 1955).  In exchange for investment and risk capital, promoters initially asserted 
themselves over industrialists by requiring payment for their financial services through a portion 
of the new corporation’s stock (Commission & House, 1901), but starting with Morgan, the 
additional practice of demanding board seats in the new corporations took hold (Roy, 1997).   
In the 1900 Presidential election, again between McKinley and Bryan, the Republican 
slogan of “Four More Years of the Full Dinner Pail” reflected the economic prosperity of the 
past four years, signaling McKinley as the winning incumbent.  In return, the McKinley 
administration’s passage of the Gold Standard Act of 1900 further aided and abetted Eastern 
banking and financial concerns, and sided against Western agrarian and mining interests.  The 
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stock and M&A markets boomed into the 1900s as a consistent stream of merger activity 
necessitated further stock financing, while the profit-making potential of the latter in turn 
enabled the growth opportunities of the former.  On August 7, 1896, a year before the Great 
Merger Wave, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 28.66.  At the height of the merger 
boom, the index peaked at 78.26 on June 17, 1901. 
However, this virtuous cycle began to unravel when corporations were left unable to pay 
dividends to investors on overcapitalized stock, “watered” by the same financiers who had at 
first promoted them (Commission & House, 1901).  On November 19, 1903, the Dow fell to a 
low of 42.15.  And Republican jubilation at the 1900 election outcome, however, was short-
lived.  McKinley was assassinated in August 1901 by self-proclaimed anarchist Leon Czolgosz.  
His last words were "I killed the President because he was the enemy of the good people – the 
good working people. I am not sorry for my crime" (Seibert, 2002).  One of the few anarchists to 
defend Czolgosz, Emma Goldman attacked McKinley as the "president of the money kings and 
trust magnates.” 
 
3.3.6 Into the 20th Century: 1900s & 1910s 
Although anarchism never achieved mainstream popularity, Progressivism did.  Begun in 
the 1890s and dedicated to regulation of business, commitment to public service, and expansion 
of government’s scope, Progressivism grew alongside big business and focused on union 
organization, repeal of child labor, and “trust-busting.”  Following McKinley’s assassination, 
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President Theodore Roosevelt began reversing many of the initiatives fostered under McKinley.  
Attorney General Philander Knox famously filed suit in 1902 against the Northern Securities 
railroad holding company.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 1904 sided with the U.S. 
government, that “tight” combinations could be prosecuted under the Sherman Antitrust Act as 
being in illegal restraint of trade (Lamoreaux, 1985).  With this legal precedent, trust-busting 
would continue under the 1908 Taft administration and culminate in the Clayton Antitrust Act of 
1912, prohibiting the horizontal mergers that had been popular years before.   
Parallel developments soon followed.  Under the Elkins Act of 1903 and the Hepburn Act 
of 1906, the ICC was given the enforcement power to set maximum railroad rates and the ability 
to view any railroad’s financial records despite legal resistance.  With the Payne-Aldrich Tariff 
of 1909, the first change in tariff laws since the Dingley Act, ad valorem tariffs on some goods 
were reduced.  Finally, the Panic of 1907 induced a sea change in public attitudes toward 
financiers.  The near-bankruptcy of major U.S. banks required the personal intervention of J.P. 
Morgan himself to organize emergency European funding, redirect money between banks, and 
buy falling stocks of notable corporations.  The Panic ended quickly, but banking and political 
leaders, bending to charges of crony capitalism, passed the Federal Reserve Act of 1912 (with 
Morgan’s blessing) to establish a system of twelve Federal banks in order to provide greater 
liquidity and opportunities for the money supply to expand and contract seasonally with the 
economy.  The high-flying days of finance capitalism were over. 
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3.4 RESULTS 
The preceding narrative provided a rich description of the Great Merger Wave.  In this 
section, I describe the robust process obtained from my process-tracing analysis.  I specify the 
initial condition and the three subprocesses leading to the Great Merger Wave. 
 
3.4.1 A Robust Process for the Great Merger Wave 
  Figure 7 establishes the initial conditions on the left: (1) the development of a rapidly 
privatizing, economically integrating and financially maturing network for transporting goods 
long distances (the railroads).  This motivates a set of three actors to behave in characteristic, 
somewhat predictable (but not precisely identical across episodes) ways, as shown in the left-
center of Figure 7: (2a) politicians assume for private corporations laissez-faire regulation; (2b) 
industrialists compete in the newly formed huge national market; and (2c) financiers begin to 
arbitrage lucrative industrial securities.  All three interact to produce a (3) burst of consolidation, 
as shown in the center of Figure 7.19 
                                                 
19 Note that this robust process is not a law-like generalization, because the privatization, market convergence and 
financial maturation of the railroads are initial conditions that are essential to motivating the rest of the process.  In 
other words, the process does not operate independent of those initial conditions, but is rather precisely a statement 
about the initial conditions (Goldstone, 1991).  Furthermore, note that politicians may not necessarily have 
transferred privatization to the joint stockholder corporation despite the pro-business clamor of their constituents, if 
as a group those politicians felt strongly enough that privatization would ultimately lead to abuses of the public trust 
by big business.  Similarly, the connecting of local regional markets to a huge national one may not have necessarily 
induced industrialists to engage in internecine price warfare despite the pregnant possibility of enormous profits, had 
these men felt it was not in their collective economic interest to do so.  And financiers may not necessarily have 
begun trading in riskier and less well-known industrial stocks and bonds despite lucrative prospects for arbitrage, 
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3.4.2 Support for the Robust Process 
3.4.2.1 The initial condition   
Chandler (1965) already noted the importance of the railroads as the precursor of today’s 
big business.  Indeed, the modern corporation arose in large part from the advances in 
administrative and financing techniques that the 19th century railroads pioneered.  Yet although a 
precise connection from the railroads to the Great Merger Wave has not, to my knowledge, been 
established by previous business historians, it would seem logical that the rise of American big 
business would share the same origin as its birth.  As such, I observed in the data three ways in 
which the railroads developed: (1) politico-legally, (2) economically, and (3) financially.  I 
discuss these three characteristics in turn. 
 In the mid-19th century, the railroads were quasi-public entities supported by land grants 
and economic subsidies from the Federal government (Chandler, 1965; Roy, 1997).  And during 
the American Civil War, the railroads were nationalized to move men and munitions to strategic 
locations on the warfront.  However, the North’s eventual victory ended the railroads’ expressly 
military raison d'être, as these transportation networks began privatizing during post-war 
Reconstruction to accept the burgeoning commercial trade and civilian cargo.  With the onset of 
privatization came the advent of laissez faire, still novel in the 19th century.  Government works 
before the 20th century had typically been a matter of civic pride and duty.  However, the idea of 
                                                                                                                                                             
had these men agreed to be sufficiently risk-averse to avoid an ensuing market bust.  But given human nature, it 
would have been highly unlikely had these actors expressed collective restraint in the face of extreme temptation.  
Therefore, the process is robust because actors respond to a set of necessary initial conditions in characteristic 
fashion, to produce a predictable outcome.  Indeed, Goldstone (1991) insightfully remarks that it is the belief that 
human beings do act in a consistent or discernibly rational (though perhaps not precisely predictable) fashion which 
makes social science possible. 
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removing government “interference” from private industry began to take hold until, by the 
1890s, it had become a cause célèbre of Republican politicians (Roy, 1997). 
Additionally, in the mid-19th century working for the railroads was the conventional way 
of entering the ranks of management.  Indeed, the “line and staff” distinction, the multi-
divisional structure, and the huge, vertically integrated organization with central offices in a 
large cosmopolitan city coordinating branch office activities in smaller regional markets,  all 
originated with the railroads (Chandler, 1965).  But as the century progressed, manufacturing 
first equaled and then overtook transportation as the main engine of economic growth.  The 
national market created by the railroads lifted the population from a primarily agrarian rural base 
to an increasingly urbanized industrial core (Chandler, 1959).  Thus, the railroads were involved 
in their own demise by gradually transferring the nexus of power from railroad men to 
industrialists as the delivery of goods became the handmaiden to the production of goods.20 
As railroad construction required more sophisticated financing, investment bankers were 
increasingly employed to underwrite railroad securities and promote railroad mergers.  For 19th 
century financial markets, railroad stocks and bonds formed the lion’s share of securities issues, 
and financial innovations such as preferred stock and mortgage, income and convertible bonds 
were first worked out with railroad securities (Chandler, 1965).  However, the Panic of 1893 
significantly derailed railroad expansion and the ensuing depression made swift work of railroad 
stocks (Navin & Sears, 1955).  However, industrial securities fared better as a whole, some even 
                                                 
20  Chandler (1959) writes of the meat-packing industry’s Swift brothers, who saw demand for fresh meat in Eastern 
cities like New York, Philadelphia and Boston rise with the increasing supply of livestock massing in the American 
Plains.  The Swift brothers struggled throughout the 1880’s to perfect deliveries of fresh butchered meat preserved 
in refrigerated railroad cars to urban dwellers on the East Coast.  The railroads had become a means to an end rather 
than an end in itself.  
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earning positive returns throughout the 1890s; thus, independent promoters like John R. Dos 
Passos, issuing common alongside preferred stock in order to achieve speculative profits, began 
attracting the investing public in industrials instead.21  By century’s end, the investment 
community was squarely focused on industrial stocks. 
Interestingly, Gort (1969), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and other neoclassical 
economists have argued that exogenous regulatory, technological or economic shocks generate 
periods of asset reallocation within and across industries to form aggregate M&A waves.  In that 
regard, the Panic of 1893 could be seen as one such shock that generated the Great Merger 
Wave.  And indeed the Panic does represent a point in time when the attention of regulators, 
industrialists and financiers began to focus on American big business.  Yet I believe the Panic of 
1893 hastened the wave; it did not cause it.  For example, in the historical record, Andrew 
Carnegie started his steel company from personal profits amassed speculating in railroads, and 
built it by selling steel to railroad and locomotive companies (Roy, 1997).  Analogously, for 
SOC earthquakes, the gradual rubbing of crustal plates deep below the Earth’s surface is the 
fundamental trigger, not the externally visible top-level cracking of the Earth’s crust immediately 
before.  Thus, the Panic was the more visible but more peripheral driver, while the railroads were 
the less visible but more fundamental cause of the Great Merger Wave. 
 
                                                 
21  Stearns and Allan (1996) mention that one necessary condition for M&A waves is a financial innovation which 
enables the business community to perform M&A deals. 
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3.4.2.2 The regulatory subprocess 
Bittlingmayer (1985) argued that 19th century antitrust policy, by legalizing merger and 
making cartels illegal, favored consolidation and thereby “caused” the Great Merger Wave.  
Furthermore, Stearns and Allan (1996) concluded that M&A waves require a lax politico-legal 
regulatory framework to allow for diffusion of the corporate M&A strategy through the rest of 
the business community.  These research findings are corroborated by the process-tracing data 
which show that laissez faire regulation and industry privatization were en vogue by the close of 
the 19th century.  For example, as the historical record suggested, the Republican McKinley 
administration assented to pro-business constituencies which cooperated to produce merger 
activity.  My regulatory sub-process gives political and legal actors a facilitating role in the Great 
Merger Wave.   
  
3.4.2.3 The economic subprocess   
Iyer and Miller (2008) suggested that M&A activity is driven by managerial search 
processes in adaptive response to performance feedback from engagement with the external 
environment.  As the historical data seems to corroborate, falling performance levels triggered 
problemistic search for acquisition targets in order to adapt to interfirm competition.  In the late 
1890s, with mass-production techniques perfected and commercialized, industrialists like 
Andrew Carnegie told their managers to operate factories at full capacity despite falling market 
prices: “To keep running, not to make profit is the point we should steer to” (Lamoreaux, 1985).  
This policy was a response to high demand for a homogeneous product which generated heavy 
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competition among rival producers.  The development of a huge national market (Chandler, 
1959) merely amplified the competitive trend, with the resulting price warfare on a massive scale 
motivating vertically integrated forms of business organization, as in the case of the U.S. Steel 
merger integrating basic steel producers with makers of finished steel (Hogan, 1971).  Thus, my 
economic sub-process supports the Carnegie behavioralist interpretation of M&A activity. 
  
3.4.2.4 The financial subprocess   
For the investment community, the Great Merger Wave was demarcated by the Panics of 
1893 and 1907.  Before the Panic of 1893, financing was reserved for the underwriting and 
organizing of railroad consolidations, an activity heavily partial to the interests of single, 
powerful bankers like JP Morgan.  As independent promoters took a position of risk in peddling 
industrial securities, overcapitalization of corporations became a concern for regulators 
(Commission, 1900).  Thus, the spread of speculative securities trading generated the stock 
market boom characterizing the period of the Great Merger Wave between the two panics, 
supporting macroeconomists’ thesis that strong capital market conditions drive the M&A market 
(Nelson, 1959).  Although macroeconomists cannot explain the boom-bust patterns of both 
markets, behavioral economists would suggest that managers rationally arbitrage acquirer and 
target securities, inflating the stock market until the true value of the deal synergies is realized, 
crashing the market.  Certainly, a case can be made for this behavior happening, what with the 
interactions of bankers, lawyers, promoters and business owners as recorded by the Industrial 
Commission’s report (Commission & House, 1901), and the widespread existence of “watered 
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stock” during the Great Merger Wave.  Thus, my financial subprocess embraces the 
macroeconomic and financial behavioral economic explanations of M&A waves. 
 
3.4.2.5 The M&A wave  
The Great Merger Wave was extreme in many respects.  In the first essay I delimited the 
wave as between 1898:1 and 1902:4.  In 1897, Nelson (1959) counted 63 firm disappearances by 
merger.  In 189:1 alone, there were 132.  1899, the peak year for consolidations, witnessed 1,125 
firm disappearances, and 1901 registered another 390.  In the first essay, I compared the five 
historical U.S. M&A waves, and observed that the Great Merger Wave ranked first in amplitude, 
fourth in duration, and first in a combined or “intensity’ ranking.  The Great Merger Wave was 
also unique in that most M&A then took the form of the multi-firm consolidation as opposed to 
the modern two-party acquisition between acquirer and target.     
 
3.4.2.6 The M&A wave’s end 
If I proceed to the Great Merger Wave’s end, I observe new initial conditions that result 
in new actor reactions: (3) public criticism of big business, monopolistic industry structures and 
the overcapitalization of corporations induced by the Great Merger Wave (4a) coerces politicians 
to placate Progressivist constituents with trust-busting tactics; (4b) causes industrialists to engage 
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in inefficient management practices; (4c) leads financiers into a market bust.  These three 
reactions then generate a (5) halt to further consolidation.22 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
In this section I discuss my second essay’s potential limitations, possible implications and 
hopes for future research. 
 
3.5.1 Limitations 
One concern with process tracing is the provisional nature of its explanations.  In other 
words, my robust process could be segmented further into a yet more fine-grained chain of 
causal events.  Indeed, this is an important objection against process tracing, for it implies that 
causal inferences using one or a few cases are difficult to sustain.  But a valid rebuttal to this 
concern is that there are practical reasons, such as lack of time and research resources, for not 
further splicing the causal chain of events into smaller segments.  And admittedly, many 
scientific explanations are ultimately provisional. 
                                                 
22 Again, for this robust process of the end of the Great Merger Wave, a set of essential initial conditions exists 
without which the rest of the process could not operate: abuse of the public trust, “winner-take-all” industry 
consolidation, and watered corporate stock, respectively.  Again, politicians, industrialists and financiers are the 
three actors who react to the initial conditions in consistently rational, although not precisely predictable, ways: 
forceful regulation, unprofitable management, and financial ruin, respectively.  And the end result is a generally 
characteristic, although not completely identical, outcome: the end of an M&A wave. 
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3.5.2 Implications 
3.5.2.1 The power law 
The emergence of the power law for the size-distribution of M&A waves may be 
accounted for by my robust process.  Recall the power law implies that most M&A waves are 
small, some are medium, and a few are very large, expressive of a right-skewed, non-normal 
distribution for a non-linear phenomenon.  In normally distributed phenomena, independent-
additive effects are the norm (Andriani & McKelvey, 2007), but when the units of a phenomenon 
are interdependent-multiplicative, power law distributions naturally emerge.  Thus, I believe the 
regulatory, economic and financial sub-processes comprising our robust process may interact 
multiplicatively.  Figure 8 presents my model. 
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Figure 8.  A Model for the Power Law Size-Distribution of M&A Waves 
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Competition was considered the key driver of the Great Merger Wave (Commission, 
1900; Commission & House, 1901; Cotter, 1916).  Thus, in Figure 8 the independent variable 
predicting M&A wave size is managerial profiteering.  And since promoters and bankers 
provided the fiscal capabilities enabling M&A activity, financial facilitation is a positive 
moderator of that direct relationship.  But because politicians and the courts generated a 
contextual or situational constraint on the actions of managers and financiers, political coercion 
is a negative moderator of the managerial independent variable and the financial moderator.  My 
model thereby generates three-way interactions with nonlinearities befitting a power law. 
 
3.5.3 Future Research 
3.5.3.1 A robust process for all M&A waves   
My study lends hope to the potential generalizability of findings from the Great Merger 
Wave to other waves.  If a robust process implies that despite striking differences in historical 
situations, observers note a similar sequence of events unfolding (Goldstone, 1991), then a cross-
case comparison of process-tracing accounts of the five M&A waves in U.S. history would be a 
value-added exercise.    
For example, compare the Great Merger Wave with the 1990s wave.23  For the former, 
recall that (1) the railroads transitioned to privatization, created a huge national market, and 
                                                 
23  I choose this particular comparison because it highlights the efficacy of a “polar opposites” approach to selecting 
on the dependent variable when using qualitative methods (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  The 1900s wave 
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engendered novel investment techniques; (2a) politicians instituted laissez-faire regulation, (2b) 
industrialists engaged in economic competition and (2c) financiers performed risk arbitrage, 
producing an (3) burst of consolidation.  Now consider the 1990s M&A wave: (1) the Internet 
began as a Department of Defense communications network, authorized for commercial use in 
1995 under the Clinton administration.  With the click of a mouse, the Internet could connect 
national economies to an emerging global market.  As the Internet commercialized, trading in 
new e-business securities began in earnest.  Thus, as the rapidly privatizing, economically 
integrating and financially innovating Internet quickly developed, (2a) a Republican Congress 
and acquiescent Clinton administration relaxed antitrust enforcement, (2b) multinationals 
competed for domestic and foreign market share, and (2c) investment bankers traded e-business 
stocks in a “dot.com” bubble.  The end result was (3) the first international M&A wave.   
The practical import of this comparison is that strategies could be developed to anticipate 
and shape future M&A waves.  CAS are highly indeterminate due to their sensitivity to initial 
conditions (Holland, 1995); hence, prediction is difficult.  However, a process tracing account 
replicated across cases may identify the fundamental elements of M&A wave formation invariant 
across all waves.  Future strategists can “plan and prepare” as a technologically advanced 
transportation/communication network (1) removes itself from the jurisdiction of the public trust, 
(2) brings into contact previously unconnected product-markets, and (3) spawns creative 
financing methods.  Anticipation begins as pro-business political administrations, attractive 
                                                                                                                                                             
registered a barely mature market for capital, crude technological innovations, untried securities arbitrage tactics, 
recently developed modern managerial structures, and a sparsely populated business community.  These markets, 
strategies, structures and networks grew and developed for over a hundred years until the 1990s wave.  Thus, 
identifying a common robust process in two highly contrasting contexts would make the resulting explanation more 
robust and well-defined.  
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industry structures, and buoyant securities markets take hold.  Feasible action is then taken as 
politicians, competing firms and bankers respond to the burgeoning M&A market. 
 
3.5.3.2 “Deep” mechanisms of CAS   
I discuss the possibility of better understanding M&A wave dynamics, consistent with 
my first essay’s CAS model.  For example, I initially identify three “deep” mechanisms of CAS: 
(1) recursion (2) loop reversal (3) reticulation. 
Recursion characterizes processes that self-referentially repeat at multiple, nested levels 
of analysis.  Recursive dynamics are an essential feature of multi-level CAS such as M&A 
waves, in which simple micro-level firm interactions produce complex macro-level M&A wave 
patterns.24  In the political realm, co-located cities (e.g., Pittsburgh and Philadelphia) fought for 
consolidations within-state (e.g., Pennsylvania), while states (e.g., Pennsylvania and New Jersey) 
competed for the most incorporations within the U.S., which in turn fought for merger activity 
against western European countries (e.g., Britain, France and Germany).  In economics, 
industrialists of firms consolidated within industries (e.g., Andrew Carnegie of Carnegie Steel, 
Judge Elbert Gary of Federal Steel, and the Moore brothers of National Steel, all in heavy steel 
production), while industries (e.g., heavy steel production and finished steel products) vertically 
integrated within the U.S. economy, until America established an export trade (via U.S. Steel 
Corporation) alongside Britain, France and Germany.  In finance, investment bankers (e.g., 
Elverton Chapman and J.P. Morgan) struggled to promote M&A for their banks (e.g., Moore and 
                                                 
24  Thus, recursive dynamics account for the “Complex” in “Complex Adaptive System.” 
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Schley or JP Morgan and Company), which competed to be the dominant dealmaker on Wall 
Street, which in turn competed against the Rothschild family and Barings Bank for world 
predominance in M&A finance. 
The second mechanism, loop reversal, refers to alternating periods of self-reinforcement 
and self-regulation.  Essentially a string of short-term positive feedback loops closed by a long-
term negative feedback loop, loop reversals are necessary for CAS that must continuously 
maintain themselves in order to survive and grow (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2010).25  For the 
Great Merger Wave (as the self-reinforcing period), fiscally conservative financiers contributed 
heavily to the 1896 and 1900 Republican Presidential election campaigns, while the McKinley 
administration returned the favor with pro-business policies promoting Eastern commercial and 
financial interests.  Meanwhile, Republicans’ lax oversight of consolidations resulted from 
industrialists’ endorsement of McKinley’s pro-business platform.  Concurrently, industrialists 
made heavy use of financiers’ underwriting and promoting capabilities, while the latter extracted 
board seats and stock ownership from the new consolidations.  Toward the wave’s end (as the 
self-regulating period), the Roosevelt administration prosecuted the industrialists’ trusts and 
financiers’ “crony capitalism.”  In turn, financiers attempted to remove from power politicians 
hostile to Wall Street, while industrialists resorted to legal resource in response to antitrust 
litigation.  Finally, financiers and industrialists halted their mutually beneficial relationship as 
markets collapsed and corporations failed to pay dividends on watered stock. 
My third CAS mechanism, reticulation, refers to the connectivity of actors that permits 
social contagion processes to diffuse in a network.  Such dynamics allow local adaptations in 
                                                 
25  Thus, loop reversals account for the “Adaptive” in “Complex Adaptive System.” 
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CAS to generate widespread changes through the entire system, thus delimiting the system and 
distinguishing it from its environment.26  The connectivity of industrialists was exhibited in how 
the holding company created pyramidal management structures (Roy, 1997) that engendered 
communities of interest and board interlocks as the M&A strategy diffused rapidly throughout 
the business community (Haunschild, 1993) and connected key “hub” industrialists to peripheral 
ones in the business network.27  For bankers, strategies for promoting deals began at the 
periphery but soon became all the rage on Wall Street (Stearns & Allan, 1996).  For example, 
independent promoters with less concern for their reputation and more appetite for risk initially 
championed industrial securities (Navin & Sears, 1955), but staid, conservative bankers like JP 
Morgan made such a practice respectable (and a cliché).  Among politicians, a lack of 
reticulative dynamics can be discerned.  Federal, state and city governments were unwilling or 
unable to rally a coordinated response against the industrial combinations.  In the E.C. Knight 
case of 1895, the Supreme Court removed antitrust litigation from Federal jurisdiction.  States 
were powerless to enforce the authority of corporate charters against the economic wealth and 
interstate activities of the trusts (Roy, 1997).  And municipal governments were beholden to the 
corporations, since big business brought much-needed jobs and wealth within city limits.    
 
                                                 
26  Thus, reticulation dynamics account for the “System” in “Complex Adaptive System.”   
27  Indeed, scientists have observed that many real-world networks (e.g., number of Internet website hits, range of 
movie actor collaborations, and the size of business firms) contain long-tailed power law size-distributions of events 
(Watts, 2004). 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
My process-tracing study contributes a historical narrative of the Great Merger Wave, 
from which a process explanation accounts for the first essay’s CAS model’s power law 
signature.  With my robust process, strategists can identify weak signals of impending M&A 
waves while managers can realize the value-creation potential of future waves.  In turn, 
policymakers may identify the lever points (Holland, 1995) of waves to shape such patterns.  My 
aspiration in this study is to take a small step toward such a set of theoretical and practical 
advances. 
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4.0  EPILOGUE 
M&A waves are both theoretical conundrums and value-creation opportunities.  A critical 
realist approach lent itself to two studies: one, a traditional hypothetical-deductive description of 
all M&A waves, and the other, an unorthodox inductive-qualitative explanation of a single M&A 
wave.  Prior economic, behavioral and sociological wave theories have produced incompatible 
and reductionist explanations of M&A waves.  A CAS model can integrate these various 
accounts and throws light on the emergent properties of these phenomena.  The power law 
distribution provided empirical support for my CAS model, and its mysterious appearance 
engendered thoughtful speculation.  Although detailed predictions followed by reproducible 
experiments were infeasible for explaining M&A waves, process-tracing was a fruitful 
alternative.  Applying this within-case analytical technique to the Great Merger Wave of 1898-
1903 produced a detailed historical narrative from which a process explanation of M&A waves, 
containing economic, political-legal and financial elements, was generated.  The process-tracing 
account illustrates the process dynamics of M&A waves, and can explain the power law’s 
emergence.  As M&A waves are currently an active area of ongoing research, a future study 
might entertain pragmatically solving “real-world” managerial problems through prediction of 
these phenomena.  
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APPENDIX: THE EQUATION FOR THE POWER LAW 
To determine the equation for the power law distribution, we first use the cumulative 
distribution function and integrate the area under the log-normal curve to the right of x:  
ࡼሾࢄ ൐ ݔሿ ൌ ׬ ࢞′ିஶ ࢊ࢞ᇱ ൌஶ࢞ ࡯ࢇି૚ ࢞ିሺࢇି૚ሻ (Newman, 2005).  (1) 
I then utilize the maximum likelihood estimate for the exponent: 
ࢇ ൌ ૚ ൅ ࢔ ቂ∑ ܔܖ ࢞࢏࢞࢓࢏࢔
࢔࢏ୀ૚ ቃ
ି૚
,     (2) 
where ݔ௠௜௡ corresponds to the smallest value of x for which the power-law holds, not the 
smallest value of x measured.  This is because P[X=x] ~ x-a diverges as x approaches 0, i.e., the 
distribution deviates from the power-law form below	࢞࢓࢏࢔.  Indeed, few real-world power law 
distributions have a straight slope over their entire range, especially for smaller values of the 
measured variable (e.g., some points in the graphs in Figure 2) (Newman, 2005).   
Returning to the derivation, we multiply the probability distribution function by a 
constant C to remove the tilde:  
P[X = x] = Cx-a.     (3) 
The normalized expression of the constant is  
࡯ ൌ ሺࢇ െ ૚ሻ࢞࢓࢏࢔ࢇି૚ .     (4) 
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